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Editorial

Dear reader,

it is with great pleasure and gratitude that we welcome you to this first edition of the *Young Journal of European Affairs (YJEA)*. It has certainly been an extraordinary time for students all around the world and required immense efforts to uphold the spirit of higher education and academic curiosity while being left alone with one's thoughts, ideas and academic work most of the time. Research fundamentally relies on the exchange of ideas, experiences and points of view, all of which has barely been at our disposal as universities were among the first to close as the pandemic arose and have to a large extent still not opened up again. In light of these arguably challenging times, publishing the first edition of a student journal attests to many students' commitment to their discipline and is a confirmation of the very reason we decided to launch the *Young Journal of European Affairs* in 2020. It is not that students wouldn't have anything to contribute, it is the availability of options for them to share their insights with the world that is largely missing. As such, we are proud to be the ones to present these outstanding papers to you.

The topics addressed in this issue range from a European public sphere to European foreign policy, with a particular focus on issues concerning European foreign and security policy. You will come across pieces exploring the influence of intra-EU movement on the European identity, the composition and legitimisation of informal leadership groups as a way of circumventing deadlock on contentious issues in EU foreign policy, the effectiveness of the EU's instruments to promote democracy abroad as well as the extent to which the EU can be considered a normative foreign policy actor. While these topics certainly are of relevance for the study of the European Union in general, they are undoubtedly red-hot issues as the EU is in the pursuit of a coherent foreign policy purpose while keeping the Union from drifting apart amidst an era of crisis and rising Euroscepticism.

Our journal would certainly cease to exist without the generous support of our academic advisors and contributors. We would like to convey special gratitude to Prof Dr Berthold Rittberger, who has advised us during the initial phase of the journal and continuously offered us support based on his expertise as Co-Editor in Chief of the *Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP)*. We equally want to

reiterate our deep appreciation for the assistance of Prof Dr Christoph Demmke, whose insights and suggestions on our peer-reviewing procedure shall be mentioned at this point. Furthermore, we very gratefully acknowledge the crucial role of our peer reviewers and their invaluable contribution to this first edition. As academics between the pre-doctoral level and leading professors in our fields of study, their pro bono work for the Young Journal of European Affairs is evidence of their commitment to the discipline and student research and is highly valued by our authors and us.

With the utmost gratitude, we thank the Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science at the University of Munich for their financial support ever since we launched the YJEA in 2020. We equally would like to emphasise our gratefulness to the Alumni club of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation for their financial support of the first edition throughout 2021. It further remains to us to express our gratitude to the University Library at the University of Munich, in particular Volker Schallehn, Vanessa Gabriel and Caroline Ziegler, for providing and assisting us with this opportunity to publish the journal as an open-access outlet. Without their contribution, which they offered entirely free of charge, this presentation of the YJEA would not be possible.

In light of our closing remarks, we also want to direct our gratitude to all of our authors who entrusted us with their work and undertook impressive efforts throughout the reviewing and revision process to further enhance their contributions to the field of EU research. Our thanks also go to those whose work we couldn't publish this time but who certainly submitted relevant pieces of research. Last but not least, we especially want to thank our team, Benjamin Brown, Lara Dose, Alina Mehrens and Jakob Rindermann, for their relentless commitment and determination over the past year.

On behalf of the entire YJEA team and our authors, we hope you will enjoy this first edition of our journal and continue to follow our endeavours.

Lara Breitmoser and Florian Lenner

       Co-Founders and Co-Editors in Chief

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What is it like to be a director of a think tank, Dr Fabian Zuleeg?

This interview was conducted by Lara Breitmoser & Florian Lenner, Co-Founders and Co-Editors in Chief of the Young Journal of European Affairs (YJEA).

Dr. Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels. He holds a master's degree in Economics and International Relations from the University of St Andrews, a master's degree in Economics from the University of Glasgow and a PhD in Economics from the University of Edinburgh. Prior to joining the EPC, he worked in the private and the public sector, including for the Scottish government.

YJEA: For those of our readers who don't know you yet, could you start by briefly introducing yourself?

Dr Fabian Zuleeg: My name is Fabian Zuleeg and I'm the Chief Executive and Chief Economist of the European Policy Centre (EPC), a think tank based in Brussels. We are an independent think tank providing advice on EU policies across a whole range of activities of the European Union.

When did you decide that you would like to pursue a career in International Relations? Was there a specific moment that motivated you to follow the path of IR and Economics?

I started being interested in the wider world, Europe and beyond relatively early. I grew up in Germany but left the country when I was 15 and haven't been back since. I had an interest in travelling abroad and seeing what is happening in other countries. I come from a very political family as well, so it was natural to go in the direction of International Relations and Politics. I also had a very good teacher at school who sparked my interest in Economics. So, that came together, and I then decided to study both Economics and International Relations.

How did your studies in IR and Economics prepare you for your current position at the European Policy Centre (EPC)?

I think it's both the process of studying and the content of the studies. Studying abroad already helped me gain a different orientation. The content of my studies was on topics that have also played a role in my career, but it differs. There is less need in my day-to-day work for the more theoretical and academic areas. In particular, I did a lot of theoretical Economics and Econometrics, which I don't use at all in my day-to-day work, but some other aspects have been very helpful. So, it's mixed. But I think the most important thing is not necessarily the content, it's about the approach to studying, how you make sense of the world. I have had an analytical career ever since university, so those skills have been very important.

Before joining the EPC, you worked in academia, the public and the private sector. How did your previous positions influence the work you do now?

They were all important. In academia, I was simultaneously working on my PhD, so that taught me a lot about research discipline. A PhD is a challenging thing to do and I would only advise people to go down that road if they truly want to do it. It's a major investment of time and when you look at the return you get, it's not necessarily as great as people hope. You can learn the skills that are necessary to do

> **"A PhD is a challenging thing to do and I would only advise people to go down that road if they truly want to do it. It's a major investment of time and the return is not necessarily as great as people hope."**

research if you like the discipline. But my other work – I worked in government as well – was extremely relevant for the work of a think tank. It's important to be able to understand how the other side thinks. As a think tank, you're always trying to influence policymakers, and that includes people who work in government. But also, my work as a consultant in the private sector has been very important because you learn several skills about project management, about project acquisition, about finances, all of which you then also need in the think tank world.

What would you generally say is the value of academic experience for careers outside of academia? Why should students bother investing time and resources in academic work outside their curriculum if they are not planning on pursuing an academic career (or should they at all)?

I've always believed that it's important that people do the things they find motivating and genuinely enjoyable. The first question for me would be whether someone really

wants to do that. I think if people are trying to pursue something simply because they think they need to tick that box, it's usually not so helpful and often also not that successful. So, motivation is very important. Does it help in terms of a career? Of course, when you are selecting people for positions, you look at the whole portfolio of what they have done. And relevant academic work can also be an important factor. For me, what is very important is whether it shows motivation or not. It's not so much about the topic but about how people have pursued things. Nevertheless, you can also prove your interest in other ways. It doesn't necessarily have to be academic work. I think when you look at the kind of internships many people do, those also help. There is a wide variety of things that employers look for in the end.

To specify: What is the value of academic experience, specifically when working in a think tank? Would it be very useful to have done some research on the topics you're working on?

I think for a think tank, it's always a question of how that research is applied to the policy questions we are facing. We don't do pure academic research, and we don't want to do that. That's why we choose to be in a think tank and not in academia. Academic research can be important for us, but it must have relevance to policy questions. Very often, it is also about translating what academic research means for policymakers. I would also say that at the beginning of one's career, I wouldn't expect employees – when conducting academic research or other kinds of analysis – to come up with new things that haven't been thought of by the people who work in that field. That usually takes several years of experience. So, again, it's about demonstrating what someone's skills are, what someone's motivation is, what the interests are rather than the content of the research itself.

But I would always try to see how things can be applied. What does that mean in the real world? How can you actually get policymakers to change? Some of the things about academic research are difficult to use in the think tank world. Academic research, for example, tends to have very long time frames, while the think tank world has very short ones. Policymakers want answers now. And they want more definitive answers than those that academic research often produces. They want to know whether they should do one thing or the other. It's not helpful to say: "Both of them have advantages and disadvantages." So, it's a very different way of working. If you do work in a think tank, a lot of it is about informal exchanges, it's about trying to find effective ways of getting to the policymakers. It is also about learning specific skills, for example, writing summaries. If you cannot write a summary, it's almost guaranteed that no policymaker will read your work because they are not going to sit down and read a 20-page paper. Policymakers are extremely busy; they will read one paragraph. And if that paragraph interests them, they might read a bit more. But they are certainly not going to read a long academic paper.

How important is your resumé and research in academia for being perceived as an expert in your field? Does a PhD matter?

Certainly, some people think that a PhD is important, that it is a particular signal. I would question that a little bit. It doesn't get you very much in terms of additional employment chances or additional income. There are several studies that have looked at this over time. If you look at a PhD from a career perspective, then it is only worth doing if you want to stay in academia because there, it is somewhat of a requirement. When you look at think tanks, there is a good mixture of people who have a PhD and those who don't have a PhD. And that comes back to what I was saying about the nature of think tanks being different from academia. The kind of skills you need is not necessary in the academic sphere. But that sounds a bit too negative. Firstly, I would say that you should only do a PhD if you really want to do one. It's a very long and painful process, so if you don't want to do it, don't do it. It's not going to help you that much with your career. But if you do want to do it, then it's a worthwhile thing to do. What it does teach you are incredible research discipline and incredible focus. You learn how to deal with a particular issue in a lot of detail. But as a career tool, I wouldn't advise people to do it unless they want to stay in academia.

Would you say the value of a PhD is even less when you work in government or the private sector?

It depends a little bit. Firstly, I think it depends on what kind of PhD. When you look at life sciences, in particular, a PhD is still much more common, and I think it also does have an impact on the career trajectory. I think it can also help in government, but it also very much depends on the way a government is organised. In some governments, there is somewhat of a bonus you get by having a PhD. It's questionable whether all the time invested is then compensated, but in some others, there is no such thing. Of course, there is always a reputational gain. That does have an impact, but I don't think it has a great long-term influence. Because in the end, if people want to consider you for a job, they look at you as a package, not just a particular title. So, it's important what you have done what your interests are. And yes, your PhD can be a signal for that, but the PhD on its own doesn't necessarily do that.

How do you balance being the Chief Executive (i.e., Director) of the EPC while continuing your position as Chief Economist? What's the focus of your day-to-day work and how much time can you still allocate for research and political consultancy?

Overall, if we look at think tanks, there are essentially two different models. One is to have the management of the think tank done by people who focus on management. And the other is to have analysts who then also take on management tasks. For the EPC, we've always considered it important to have both, so that our senior management is

also from the analyst side. The drawback of that is that it is double pressure. Managing time is very difficult because there will always be management tasks that need to be done and that can mean that the analysis suffers. I think I have the advantage of having been doing this for quite a long time, and experience helps.

"In the end, we always have to recall what a think tank is for: We're here to influence policy. If we don't influence policy, there is no justification for having think tanks."

A typical day? There is no typical day. Certainly, there wasn't a typical day even before COVID. The reality is that, as opposed to academia, think tank work changes very rapidly. Even before COVID, we were doing about 200 events each year. You have to plan those, you have a number of different projects, some shorter-term, some longer-term, you have the management tasks etc. Now, in some way, there is a more typical day because all of us have spent most of the past 1,5 years in front of the computer without actually meeting people face-to-face. But in terms of the variety of things we do, it's probably even greater. The pressure has increased, we're now doing about 240-250 events a year. In a think tank, you have a lot of pressure, but you also have a lot of variety. The one constant is being in contact with policymakers. In the end, we always have to recall what a think tank is for: We're here to influence policy. If we don't influence policy, there is no justification for having think tanks. That is the only way you're going to get your analysis, your thinking, your recommendations into the policy process. It's about knowing the right people, being able to talk to them, also understanding them and making sure we give them what they need at the right moment in time. Thus, all forms of communication are a huge part of what you do in a think tank, whether in management or in analysis.

Many students are interested in working on political consultancy projects after graduating: Which key qualifications should one acquire and what are possible ways of doing so while studying?

I can only really talk about the European think tank scene. The first thing I would say is that it is challenging, but people shouldn't be discouraged by that. It's challenging in the sense that when you look at think tanks, we're actually a rather small segment. Much smaller, for example, than academia, which mirrors in terms of the opportunities.

For me, one of the key things is that applicants need to stand out. We have EPC programme assistantships which are our paid internships. If we advertise for a programme assistantship, even under the worst circumstances, we get hundreds of applications. And the vast majority of these applicants are qualified. There is no question that they have done the appropriate degree, that they have also done well enough in terms of their academic work. The challenge then is, how do you stand out from the crowd? What makes you different from what everyone else has sent in? I would

say there are two things: One is what you do outside of academia. That could be many different things. It could be internships, for example, but it could also be engagement in projects.

I think what also is very important is that one comes across as enthusiastic. I know, of course, that people are applying to more than one place, and that is perfectly fine, but if I'm getting a letter of motivation that doesn't even mention EPC and the work we do, which comes across as they haven't even looked at the website, the letter immediately goes onto the rejection pile. People need to invest a bit, and, at times, they also need to overcome their own limitations and fears. Making personal contact can be extremely important. If there are people in their environment, university professors, other people they have worked with, who can establish contact, use these contacts. It is much easier to get into something.

Also, don't wait for things to be advertised. What happens quite often with EPC assistantships is that someone leaves and we choose not to advertise because we don't want to go through 500 applications. But we look at the CVs which have come in over the last couple of months. Very often, we then appoint someone whose CV we have received earlier.

And the final point is that it doesn't necessarily have to be directly after university. The way you get into think tanks is not necessarily by getting onto the career ladder after university. Sometimes people get an internship, they get promoted and they develop an analyst career. But on many other occasions, they come from somewhere else. But if you have an interest in that career perspective, then even if you're going into another area, you should also keep an eye on what is happening in the think tank world, what is happening – in our case – in the European policy world. Show that you continue to be interested in that, start building the networks. In the end, when you're applying for a position at a think tank like EPC, that is the kind of thing we will look for.

The LSE European policy blog recently published an article that analysed the impact of academic research on policymaking. How well would you say does your work resonate with EU policymakers? And do you have specific strategies – if you can disclose them – to make your voice heard?

It's a perennial question for think tanks. What kind of impact do you have? And how do you demonstrate that impact? These two questions do not necessarily have the same answer. For those of us who have been working in the think tank field for a long time, we know that we have an impact because we can often see it. We know that we talk to the right people. Just to give you one anecdote: Hermann von Rompuy, the former president of the European Council, is now our president at the EPC. When we talked to him about taking this role at EPC, one thing he mentioned was that very often, before a summit, he would receive a commentary from the EPC, and he would always read those with interest. This represents impact because this is someone who will then go into that meeting, talk to the heads of state and governments and make decisions going forward. But it's not something we can measure.

That is one of the big problems with funders, as they very often ask for key performance indicators. They want to see how many website hits, how many media mentions we get. I personally don't think that tells you very much because if one influential person reads what you have done or if one influential person has met you at lunch and you've talked to them, that probably has more impact than ten thousand people reading an article. But it is still important that you are recognised as a voice, so in a sense, media mentions are still important and very often, politicians will look for what is in the media.

There are several cases where I've even found particular passages that come from us in official policy or strategy papers. Have they been referenced? Absolutely not. But that is the real influence because, in the end, you have given them something useful for their work. They might not even know that they have done this. They might have put something into a passage that just stuck in their head, remember an event they have taken part in, a publication they've read or a conversation they've had, and they might not even be aware that they are using or quoting something someone else has done. But we are aware of it, and we can see it. It is a much more clandestine way of trying to influence policy and, very often, you don't get public recognition. But you do get private recognition.

Is there anything extraordinary in particular that people should know about working in a think tank? Maybe a question that is connected to that: What would you say is the best and the worst part?

In a sense, the worst part is that it is quite precarious and that you don't tend to have the kind of long-term career prospects that you have in other sectors. It certainly doesn't have the stability of public sector employment. You won't receive the remuneration which you would get in the private sector. But that's also what makes it exciting. You are in between. You are not academia, you're not the public sector, you're not the private sector. You are doing something rather unique, and it is something which is exciting: To be involved in policy, to be able to influence it, to do all these things behind the scenes, to know that, for some of the big things which have happened in European politics, you've been there, and you've been a part of it. If you are interested in policy, that is a buzz. I don't think you get that anywhere else.

> **"You are doing something rather unique, and it is something which is exciting: To be involved in policy, to be able to influence it."**

As a wrap-up, is there anything you'd like to share with the readers of our first issue or any advice you would have liked to have received at the beginning of your career or when you were a student?

Pay attention to details. The one thing which astonishes me, again and again, is when we get applications and, for example, the first thing you see on the first page is a spelling mistake or that the application looks awful, it's addressed to the wrong person or the name of the person it's addressed to is spelt wrongly. These are small things, but they are an important signal to the people who are looking at them. So, pay attention to these small details. They actually matter.

The other important thing to me is to show enthusiasm. When I pick up an application, it should come across that this person wants to do this and that this is a dream for them. We had one case where someone had applied for a programme assistantship at EPC, and she had accidentally sent an email that had me copied in and wasn't intended for me. She was sending the email to a friend, writing that she was so excited about this application. Maybe it was a strategy. But if it was, it was a very good one because, in the end, we did employ her. It was obvious that this was what she really wanted to do. Yes, you must have the right qualifications, yes, you must have the languages, you must have all the things which are part of the package. But if you don't have the enthusiasm for it, there is no point in applying.

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EU Normative Foreign Policy Actorness on Iran's Nuclear Profile Capability and Limits

Abstract

Some scholars suggest that the European Union (EU) is a global actor, and its foreign policy is based on the norms and principles that have shaped and consolidated the EU itself. Reviewing the current literature on the Normative Power Europe notion and using Natalie Tocci's framework to assess normativity in foreign policy, this paper investigates to what extent the EU has been capable of independently formulating and effectively implementing its normative foreign policy on the case of the Iranian nuclear program since 2003, where the EU has sought to make Iran abide by the international law norm of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The research identifies that the formation and implementation of EU normative policies have been mainly challenged by the Realpolitik of the US, driving the EU to adopt non-normative policies or leading to embarrassing instances of inaction in the EU foreign policy for which normative power approaches offer less explanatory power. Concomitantly, the research illustrates how over time, the EU has shown greater determination to act autonomously on the Iranian nuclear profile.

Keywords: EU foreign policy, normative actorness, US foreign policy, Iran's nuclear dossier, power politics

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Introduction

The dominant approach in foreign and security policy of the European states throughout the post-World War II era, especially on issues with broader international security aspects, has been influenced mostly by transatlantic ties, i.e. allowing Washington to lead and following it. The collapse of the USSR and the establishment of the European Union (EU) affected this framework of EU-US relations. There have been moments of divergence in transatlantic relations in the perception of interests and adoption of policies, for instance, in the US Iraq war of 2003. With the commencement of the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP), the EU has been trying to shape and consolidate its foreign policy (FP) based on European norms, values, and interests, aspiring to become an independent FP actor with global reach. This has so far resulted in numerous debates about the existence and nature of the EU foreign policy (EUFP).

The EU objectives in the international area include "the development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order". It strives for upholding and strengthening international law as well as maintaining peace and security and, in following these objectives, remains committed to multilateralism (ESS, 2003, p. 11). Going more into the specifications of the EUFP, one would also notice the central role of the European and universal norms, values, and principles in the formation of the EUFP (TEU, Article 21) to the extent that some scholars suggest the EU is a "Normative Power" and its foreign policy is based on the norms and principles which have shaped and consolidated the EU itself (Manners, 2002, p. 240). On the contrary, others have noticed the gap between the EUFP discourse, which builds heavily on the power of norms and values on the one hand, and the current foreign policies of the EU and its Member States concerning their periphery and neighbours that seem to be geared to secure the European economic and security interests while providing a basis for European identity, on the other hand (Del Sarto, 2017, p. 215).

This paper aims to investigate to what extent the EU has been capable of (a) cohesively formulating its FP based on its normative objectives and principles and (b) implementing its normative approach independently from other major FP actors on major FP instances with multilateral nature. Therefore, normativity and effectiveness are the two variables analysed in the study of the EU actorness on the Iranian nuclear profile since 2003. More specifically, going beyond the ideal type of the normative EUFP, the paper tries to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of the EU normative approach theoretically as well as empirically through analysing the EU policy responses to the incidents in international politics within which they confront non-normative or realpolitik policies. This could be best researched empirically in the study of the actual EU policy responses to the foreign policy incidents with multilateral nature, where other influential FP players are also present and follow their interests.

Accordingly, EU actorness on the Iranian Nuclear Deal (the Deal) since 2003 offers an interesting case to explore the development of EU independent actorness. In *Europe*

and Iran, the Nuclear Deal and Beyond (2017), Adebahr investigates the capabilities as well as the limitations of the EU effective multilateralism till the conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015. He concludes that the EU actorness on the Iranian nuclear profile leading to the 2015 nuclear agreement brought a victory to the EU and enhanced its matureness as a foreign policy actor. Yet, the later developments of the case leading to the 2018 US withdrawal from the Deal and the EU responses to it, such as the introduction of the Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchange (INSTEX) in 2019, have remained rather under-researched. Hence, scrutinising the later developments of the case, the paper tries to depict an updated profile of the EUFP based on its actorness in the Iranian nuclear case.

The case study portrays the EU's determination to follow its announced normative goal of making Iran comply with the international law norm of non-proliferation. Yet, in some cases, such as during the 2003-2005 period, the E3/EU actorness was closer to the Imperial style of FP making, as their position was more to serve the US position than an internationally justifiable interpretation of Iran's obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. In the wake of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, the EU showed greater political resolve to formulate its independent policy from the US. Yet, when it came to internalise the costs of this political decision, the EU could not use its economic power and leverage it effectively to implement its intended policy. Identifying the causes of *inaction*, when action is required, the paper recognises a major obstacle that negatively affects the EU capability to follow its normative approach, i.e. the United States unilateral or non-normative policies that stand in contrast with the EU normative approach.

The paper proceeds in three sections: The next one, building on Tucci's work (2007, 2008), conceptualises normative foreign policy actorness and sets an analytical framework to assess normativity in foreign policy. Then, the EU will be depicted as a normative foreign policy actor relying on the "Normative Power Europe" (NPE) literature. It also forms a theoretical critique of the NPE, which falls short of accounting for *power* as the major variable in international relations, specifically in the international security arena. The third section examines the normativity and effectiveness of the EU actorness on the Iranian nuclear profile since 2003 and follows its developments until today. The paper concludes with some critical considerations about the applicability of the normative conceptions of the EU actorness.

Normative Foreign Policy

The distinction between three sources of power in the international sphere, i.e. military power, economic power, and the power of ideas, is widely discussed and accepted by many scholars. The idea of normative power in foreign policy is mostly associated with the power of ideas and opinions (Manners, 2002) or soft power (Nye, 2004). Manners (2002) defines normative power as the one which works through the power of ideas and opinions and is able to shape what is "normal" (p. 240). Normative power is a kind of

hegemonic power with particular norms that utilises specific means, mainly civilian means, to shape others' values and make them do what they would not do otherwise, without resorting to coercion and force (Diez, 2005, p. 616).

Normative power could be understood in two ways: neutral and non-neutral. While the former is mostly associated with having the capacity of shaping norms in foreign policy without attaching moral-ethical attributes to them, the latter is linked to certain moral-ethical values that are supposed to have an acceptable level of universality and legitimacy. All major and even regional powers like China or India would be, in different levels, normative foreign policy actors in the second sense, while the EU could be considered as an example of the non-neutral normative power. In order to distinguish a non-neutral normative power in foreign policy from a self-serving expression and imposition of power, some external standards or reference points would be necessary.

Searching for standards to define normative power in foreign policy to distinguish it from a sheer expression of power, Tocci (2007) suggests a framework, distinguishing between three dimensions of normativity in foreign policy. They are respectively "what an actor wants" or **goals**, "how it acts", i.e. the **deployment of the means**, and finally "what it actually achieves" the **impacts** (p. 3). Normative goals in foreign policy are those that try to go beyond the realm of national concerns and interests or "possession goals" and deal with the wider environment or "milieu goals". In this sense, international law, international institutions, and international regimes are very crucial as they set the normative framework to structure the relations of the actors in the milieu to pursue their possession goals. Again law, in general, serves as a protecting shield against the sheer imposition of will or power and provides a normative boundary for the actors to interpret and pursue their codified norms. In short, "normative foreign policy goals are those which aim to shape the milieu by regulating it through international regimes, organizations, and law" (Tocci, 2007, p. 4).

Normative goals in foreign policy could be followed by normative and non-normative means. For instance, preventing the third country from the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could be pursued through non-normative means like bombarding the arsenals of the weapons as a military response or through normative means like diplomacy, financial-technical assistance, or economic sanctions. A normative foreign policy actor would necessarily pursue its normative goals through normative means, i.e. those associated with civil means rather than military ones and include economic, cultural, social, and diplomatic instruments.

Nonetheless, for Tocci, the main question regarding the normative means pertains to *how* to use them instead of *what* means to use them. She mainly focuses on the notion of "legality". As long as an instrument remains in the confinements of law, internally, i.e. meeting the standards of democracy, transparency, and accountability, and externally, i.e. meeting the standards of international law, it would be considered as normative means of foreign policy (Tocci, 2007, p 6).

And finally, to become a normative foreign policy actor, the actual results or impacts also matter as it would not be enough only to declare normative intents and goals. Accordingly, a normative power should be *effective* in fulfilling its normative goals. To assess the effectiveness, *actions* as well as *inactions* matter. In this regard, a "normative impact is one where a traceable path can be drawn between an international player's direct or indirect actions and inactions (or series of actions) on the one hand and the effective building and entrenchment of an international rule-bound environment on the other" (Tocci, 2007, p. 7).

In reality, it is more likely to come across cases where some elements of normative FP exist and some do not. Exploring different combinations of existence or non-existence of the three elements of normative foreign policy, i.e. normative goals, normative means, and normative impact, Tocci (2007) suggests a set of stylised FP types. The combination of the first two elements, normative goals and means, produces four FP styles; **normative, realpolitik, imperial, and status quo**.

		Legitimisation of foreign policy goals	
		Normative	Non-Normative
Foreign policy means	Normative	**Normative**	**Status Quo**
	Non-normative	**Imperial**	**Realpolitik**

Figure 1: Foreign Policy Types (Tocci, 2007, p. 7)

This framework, going beyond an ideal definition of normative FP, would help us understand which of the three requirements of normative foreign policy is met. Considering the EU as a normative FP actor implies that the actual foreign policies of the EU in each case should be defined normatively, followed by normative means, and bring about some normative impact to be received as effective. The next section seeks the grounds of considering the EU as a normative actor in the literature as well as in the EU constitutive and strategic documents and reviews the implications of considering the EU as a normative FP actor.

EU as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor

"A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be

paid, including in their relationship with the European Union." (ESS, 2003, p. 12)

Scholars with different theoretical approaches have discussed the EUFP building on the normative power in a non-neutral sense (Manners, 2002, Diez, 2005, Lucarelli and Manners 2006, Whitmann, 2011, Thomas, 2011). Manners (2002) suggests that "Normative Power Europe" (NPE) is a theoretical framework to understand what kind of construction the EU *is,* a description of what it *does* beyond its borders, alongside with a normative aspect, i.e. what the EU *should do* accordingly in the international system. Whitman (2011) suggests that NPE seeks a "collective purpose and legitimacy" for the EU and links it to the foreign policy of the Union, which should be understood alongside a plethora of similar theoretical concepts such as "post-modern" or "ethical" power", "power for good", "peacebuilder in the world" etc. that resort to a "discourse of universal ethics" (p. 25).

Diez (2005) suggests that the perception of the EU as a normative actor is preceded by François Duchêne's discussion on the European Community (EC) as a "civilian power" in contrast with the military one, in the early 1970s, asserting that the EC had developed as a non-military or civilian form of power. (Diez, 2005, pp. 616). The three key features of a civilian power are "centrality of economic power to achieve national goals", "the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems", and "the willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress" (Manners, 2002, p. 236). Conversely, critics such as Kagan (2003) describe NPE as a point of weakness that has been opted for as an outcome of the EU's incoherent foreign policy apparatus and lack of hard power means and resources.

Yet, numerous studies have observed a great gap between the normative discourse of the EUFP and the EU's interest-based policies in its external relations (Del Sarto, 2015, 216), prompting others to elaborate on the notion and meaning of normativity in EUFP against the backdrop of a broader debate in international relations (IR) literature between constructivist approaches building on ideational matters and norms on the one hand, and realist or rationalist accounts that put more emphasis on instrumental rationality and interests. For instance, Diez (2005) argues that "strategic interests and norms cannot be easily distinguished, and that the assumption of a normative sphere without interests is in itself nonsensical" (p. 625). Del Sarto (2015), similarly, puts aside the instrumental-normative dispute and conceptualises the EU as an *empire* and argues that "the EU's exporting of rules and practices to neighbouring states" furthers its own security and economic interests, agreeing implicitly with Diez that it also serves the construction of European identity (p. 216).

In contrast, Manners argues that, unlike other FP actors, the EU *is* itself a normative construction, namely that the normative basis of Europe has been shaped throughout its post-World War II history with the five core norms of *Peace*, *Liberty*, *Democracy*, *the Rule of Law*, and respect for *Human rights and Fundamental Freedom*. The first two are the immediate post-War norms necessary to the formation of European society,

and the rest were developed mostly during the Cold War to distinguish the west from east Europe. There are also four minor norms, i.e. social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance (Manners, 2002, p. 242). Accordingly, NPE has to do with 'ideological power' that desires to move beyond the debate over state-like features through an understanding of the EU's international identity" (Manners, 2002, p.239).

 A review of the main EC/EU constitutive document, i.e. the preambles to the European Coal and Steel Treaty (1951), the Treaty Establishing the European Community (1957), and the amended Treaty on European Union (2007) confirms the core of Manners ideal perception that the EU is founded on certain norms and does accordingly in its foreign relations. Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty expresses that the fundamental constitutive basis of the EU is founded on the "values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights". This, together with Article 21.1 on *General Provisions on the Union's External Action,* which expresses that the "Union's action on the international scene" is based on the pursuit of the same values in the international arena, constitutes the cornerstone of the EUFP discourse. Moreover, the major EU strategic documents underscore the importance of rule-based international order and the centrality of the UN for international security and emphasise the EU's commitment to upholding International Law (ESS, 2003, p. 11, EUGS, 2016, p. 32).

One may, however, wonder which FP principle(s), norm(s), or value(s) should be prioritised in case of a conflict between different principles, norms, and values that inform the EUFP. Moreover, when a normative component of the EUFP contradicts the EU economic and security interests, which one should be served with priority? Neither the constitutive or strategic documents of the EU nor the ENP narrative of the EUFP elaborate on such cases and situations. More specifically, the NPE approach does not elaborate on such instances in international politics, in which the competitive or confrontational features occasionally play a substantial role, most notably in international security issues. Such instances that are outcomes of competition, conflict of interests, and power relations have remained outside the explanatory power of the NPE, and the given examples have been so far confined to non-confrontational ones such as diffusion of human rights norms as well as economic and development cooperation. Nonetheless, as some scholars have noticed, cooperative solutions in international security issues do not necessarily realise, and power politics is more decisive for the final solution of the conflicts (Harnisch, 2007).

In short, the ideal type of the EUFP, with its reliance on the normative power of some presumably universal norms, values, and principles, is more self-centred and less sensitive to the intersubjective/interactional feature of politics as well as the realities of power relations and power politics. The case study of the EU policies on Iranian nuclear profile investigates with more detail the effect of international power politics as a limiting factor on the implementation and effectiveness of the normative EUFP. The case study will focus on the moments in which the EU policies have been subjected to

and affected by the effects of power relations and not-necessarily-normative policies of other FP actors to showcase some limitations of the normative approach of the EUFP. Concomitantly, the case study depicts the gradual improvements of the EUFP as well as the salience of the strategic autonomy for the consolidation of the EUFP.
The EU and Iran's Nuclear Program

In this section, the paper qualitatively assesses the EU policies on the Iranian nuclear program throughout its different stages, from 2003 when the dossier was officially opened to the 2015 Deal, and from then to the US withdrawal from the Deal under the Trump administration and the latest developments to restore the Deal under the Biden administration. The paper seeks to understand to what extent the EU's goals, means, and the created impacts have been normative, according to the established framework, and investigates the effective variables that hindered the EU's capability to follow its normative foreign policy on the Iranian nuclear program.

Iran's Nuclear Dossier

Iran launched its nuclear program in the 1950s under the auspices of the US under the Atom for Peace program. Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ratified it in 1970. European countries like France and Germany also started nuclear cooperation with Iran till the 1979 revolution in the country, when most international nuclear cooperation was cut off. By that time, Iran had developed its program to some extent, including the Bushehr nuclear project constructed by a joint venture of Siemens AG and AEG, with two reactors being 50 per cent and 85 per cent complete. After the revolution, Iran's efforts to get the Western contractors to resume the work or to find new ones were not successful, in some cases due to the US pressures. Later in the 1990s, Iran began to cooperate with Russia on its nuclear program, including resuming Bushehr nuclear project (Vaez & Sajjadpour, 2013).

In 2003, after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had not declared its enrichment and processing activities, including enrichment facilities in Natanz and heavy water reactor of Arak, *Iran's nuclear dossier* came into existence. From 2003 to 2005, first the E3 and from 2004, the E3/EU became active to peacefully resolve the case, against the backdrop of the US invasion of Iraq and the increased risk of a US military intervention in Iran. This initiative finally amounted to the Tehran Declaration followed by the Paris Agreement in 2004 under which Iran agreed to cooperate fully with the IAEA, sign the Additional Protocol, and temporarily suspend all uranium enrichment activities voluntarily as a confidence-building step to find a comprehensive solution in exchange for civil nuclear cooperation and a deferral of the UN Security Council action (Adebahr, 2017, p. 119).

Nonetheless, these initiatives were aborted. The parties, having different legal interpretations of the Paris Agreement specifically regarding the right of Iran under the NPT to enrich uranium on its soil, accused each other of breaching the agreement and with Ahmadinejad in power in Iran in 2005 and the change of leadership in Europe the

Paris Agreement framework was left aside. Iran removed its voluntary measures and resumed enriching uranium. During this period, the UN Security Council adopted seven resolutions against Iran's nuclear activities and imposed sanctions on Iran, being accompanied by the US and the EU bilateral sanctions on Iran, including an oil embargo, sanctions on a large number of Iranian banks and insurance companies, and denied Iranian banks' access to SWIFT (Coville, 2014).

Parallel to the sanctions and restrictive actions, the E3/EU+3 (the UK, France, Germany/EU + the US, China, and Russia) negotiations were going on from 2006 and lasting inconclusive till 2012. During this period, the EU engaged with Iran through leveraging its Trade Cooperation Agreement as an incentive to persuade Iran to cooperate and imposed several rounds of autonomous economic and financial sanctions on Iran, including **restriction on trade in goods**; **restrictions in the financial sector**; **restrictions in the transport sector**; and **travel restrictions and asset freeze** (European Council, 9.4.2019). Promising to de-escalate the conflict and remove sanctions through negotiations in his presidential campaign, Hassan Rouhani took office in August 2013 in Iran. Subsequently, in November, the negotiations between Iran and the E3/EU+3 resulted in the conclusion of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), also known as the Geneva interim agreement, as a roadmap for further negotiations to reach a comprehensive agreement.

The Conclusion of the JCPOA

After almost 20 months of intense negotiations, in July 2015, Iran and the E3/EU+3 confirmed an agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) along with the "Roadmap Agreement" between Iran and the IAEA. The JCPOA, commonly known as **Iran nuclear deal** or **Iran deal,** set a framework to resolve all the disputes regarding the Iranian nuclear dossier. Iran assumed some restrictions on its nuclear program, and the IAEA verified and reported on Iran's abiding by its commitments. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2231 endorsing the JCPOA with all member states obligated to accept and carry it out under Article 25 of the Charter of the UN. It provided for the termination of the provisions of previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue (UNSC, 2015, background).

The JCPOA's main purpose was to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of UN, US, and EU nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran reaffirms not to develop, seek or acquire nuclear weapons. It also agrees to sell its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium and reduce the volume of low-enriched uranium stockpile to a certain level; phase out its heavy water reactor and not build any new one and follow transparency and confidence-building measures on a step-by-step basis. The parties agreed that Iran has the right to enrich uranium up to 3.67 per cent for its nuclear program inside Iran, keep the necessary amount adequate for its nuclear needs up to 300 kilograms, and sell the extra to other countries. The IAEA will have regular access to Iranian facilities to

monitor and verify the implementation of the steps as well as the peaceful nature of the program (E3/EU+3 & Iran, 2015).

On the other hand, the JCPOA required the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran and the removal of limitations on finance, trade, and investment. Two major limitations that had imposed crippling pressure on the Iranian economy, i.e. sanctions on the Iranian oil industry and sanctions against the Iranian financial and banking system, among others, were supposed to be terminated under the JCPOA regime. Subsequently, enthusiasm about doing business with and accessing the Iranian market grew, especially for the European businesses that used to have a presence in Iran. It was also welcomed by Iranian businesses and the long-time isolated economy. However, it gradually turned out that the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions was not successful in kick-starting business with Iran. One year after the implementation, the Iranian banking system still lacked normal international ties, and major financial institutions remained circumspect, mainly due to the effect of the US primary sanctions in non-nuclear areas such as money-laundering and terrorist financing, as well as the political uncertainty under the Trump administration. (Adebahr, 2018, p. 3, International Crisis Group, 2017).

The US Withdrawal from Iran Deal

While it seemed that the international community had finally found a peaceful mechanism to resolve the protracted Iranian nuclear conflict despite its limitations to normalise Iran's economic relations with the world, Washington's policy towards Iran changed under the new administration since early 2017 to a more aggressive one. In October 2017, the US president refused to certify to the US Congress that relieving Iran's nuclear sanctions was in the US interest and argued that Iran violated the deal, contrary to the IAEA's thirteen reports issued by then confirming Iran's commitment to the deal. Finally, on 8 May 2018, Donald Trump fulfilled his campaign promise to withdraw the US from the Iran deal, disregarding the concerns of the EU and other parties to the Deal. The US re-imposed all the previous sanctions in full force and started a "maximum pressure campaign" on Iran. As a result, major European businesses left Iran to protect themselves against US sanctions (Adebahr, 2018, p. 8).

The EU condemned the US unilateral withdrawal and re-stated its commitment to the deal without offering any remedies to the EU businesses that had already started to leave Iran. As an example, the national Iranian airline "Iran Air" ordered 100 passenger aircraft to Airbus and 80 to Boeing to upgrade its long-time sanctioned fleet. The US Treasury revoked licenses for the American Boeing and Europe's Airbus to sell commercial planes to Iran Air. The EU could not convince the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to issue licenses for the delivery of purchased Airbus planes (Reuters, 17.12.2018). Under the "unprecedented financial pressure" of the US sanctions, which were intended to be "the strongest sanctions in history", Iran demanded the EU and other European JCPOA parties to fulfil their role as the remaining parties to the Deal.

In September 2018, expressing that that "the lifting of sanctions is an essential dimension of the JCPOA", the E3/EU promised to install an EU-Iran trade channel to facilitate legitimate financial transactions of the European businesses with Iran "to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Iran deal". After months of waiting, the establishment of the Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchange (INSTEX) was announced by Germany, France, and the UK as the shareholders, with the long-term aim of being "open to economic operators from third countries who wish to trade with Iran" and promising to "explore how to achieve this objective" (EEAS, 31.1.2019). Despite early optimism, the INSTEX failed to fulfil its objectives to offset the impact of the sanctions on Iran or even to serve as a banking channel for humanitarian transfers (Sauerbrey, 2020).

In response, criticising the Europeans' inaction against the US pressure while insisting Iran abide by its commitments, Iran started a policy of "remedial measures" and expressed that it would "immediately reverse" them after the US rejoins the Deal. On the first anniversary of the US withdrawal, Iran announced its non-commitment by certain commitments such as the volume of enriched uranium and urged the remaining parties to fulfil their commitments under the JCPOA to protect Iran's interests against the US sanctions (Radio Farda, 8.5.2019). In January 2020, Iran abandoned all limitations on the uranium enrichment cap imposed by the JCPOA, and one year later, it started to enrich uranium to 20 per cent purity (BBC, 4.1.2021). In response, acknowledging the issues arising from the US unilateral withdrawal from the Deal, the EU announced its deep concern about the steps taken by Iran over the last two years, urged Iran to reverse all the actions inconsistent with the JCPOA, and supported diplomatic efforts to preserve the Deal (European Council, 11, 1.2021).

While the US maximum pressure campaign on Iran continued till the very last days of the Trump administration, President Biden followed his promised policy of rejoining the JCPOA. The EU welcomed it and expressed its support for diplomatic efforts facilitating a US return to the Deal (European Council, 11, 1.2021). In early April 2021, the Joint Commission of the JCPOA held a meeting in Vienna to discuss the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA, given the possible return of the US to the agreement. Iran and the US started indirect talks during the meeting.

Assessing EUFP Actorness on Iran's Nuclear Program: Capability and Limits

It should be noted that despite early hope for the final settlement of the case after the conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015, at the time of writing, the dossier is still open, and a final assessment of each party's role is not yet possible. The EU's announced goal has been to make Iran abide by the non-proliferation commitment as a norm of a rule-based international order and international law. During the assessment period, the EU has been engaged closely with Iran and other major international players, following its effective multilateralism approach. It has applied different means to reach its goals, such as several rounds of negotiations, putting pressure on Iran through restrictive measures as well as proposing economic incentives.

The EU has been active on the Iranian nuclear profile from the very early stages of it and during the different phases of negotiations. It was right after the EU introduced its ESS in 2003 to establish itself as an autonomous FP actor, and some observers have considered Iran's nuclear dossier as a test for the effectiveness of the EUFP. The E3/EU played as a major actor in the pre-US withdrawal stages of the dossier, specifically in the negotiations between 2003 to 2005 leading to the Paris agreement. After the US invasion of Iraq and under the shadow of increased risk of a US military intervention, the EU showed commitment to its norms of negotiation, engagement, multilateralism, and conformity with international law in conflict management. Yet, after the US left the deal in 2018, the EU was not able to play a major role, benefitting from its multilateral approach. The uncertainty in the transatlantic relations throughout the Trump administration, observable in the EU-US divergent approach to the settlement of Iran's nuclear case, reveals a limitation of the EU's autonomous actorness on the global scene.

Despite the E3/EU's bolder actorness during the 2003-2005 negotiations, this initiative finally failed to fulfil its purpose. One of the reasons for its failure that is important from the viewpoint of this research was the different interpretations the parties had on the rights and obligations of the parties under the NPT, specifically regarding whether Iran had the right to enrich uranium on its soil for peaceful purposes or not. The EU was insisting on an "indefinite cessation of enrichment activities" and even "dismantlement of enrichment facilities" while Iran was invoking its right to enrich uranium after giving objective guarantees about the peacefulness of its nuclear program through transparency and full cooperation with the IAEA. Yet, as some observers have expressed, the EU's strict interpretation was influenced by the US pressure than conforming to the international law norm of non-proliferation. (Adebahr, 2017, 119).

The EU's strict position on implementing the Paris Agreement was based on a legal interpretation that could never gain international authorisation and support, neither by the IAEA nor by the NPT community including in the NPT Review Conference held in May 2005. The EU's position was closer to the US's, which held Iran to be denied of developing full fuel cycle activities, including the uranium enrichment, than an internationally acceptable legal interpretation of the NPT (Harnisch, 2007, 11, Adebahr, 2017, 119). This position was left aside in the later negotiations concluding to the 2013 JPA and the 2015 JCPOA. According to a former Iranian diplomat and negotiator in the 2003-2005 period, the agreed-upon principles in the JCPOA to resolve the crisis "were exactly the same principles that Iran had proposed in March 2005, and which the United States had rejected due to its insistence on zero enrichment." (Mousavian & Mousavian, 2018, p. 179).

According to Harnisch (2007), minilateral cooperation in security affairs, unlike in the trade and economic realm, does not necessarily translate into multilateral cooperation. Assessing the E3/EU actorness on Iran's profile in the 2003-2005 period, he sees the recognition and support of the E3/EU actorness by the US "as the single most important factor that influenced the course of the initiative". (p. 19). Not surprisingly, the E3/EU's interpretation of the Paris Agreement, among others, revealed a limitation of the EU normative FP actorness, which arises out of the realities of power relations in

international politics. Nonetheless, the conceptualisation of the EUFP actorness in NPE, which is built upon the power of norms, values, and images, falls short of explaining the outcomes that are influenced by such power relations in international politics, specifically in the realm of international security.

To sum up, though the announced goal of the EU actorness on Iran's nuclear profile, i.e. making Iran abide by the non-proliferation commitment corresponds to a norm of a rule-based international order and international law, the E3/EU position and interpretation of the Paris Agreement does not conform to Tocci's normative goals criterion and should be considered a deviation from the EU's normative approach. The E3/EU policy in this period rather approaches the imperialist style of FP, i.e. pretending to pursue normative goals and occasionally developing new norms to be followed by all means at the disposal (Tocci, 2007, p. 7). The policy was followed temporarily, and the EU did not insist on it throughout the later stages of the negotiations, in line with a change in the US position that accepted Iran's right to develop full-cycle nuclear activities.

Throughout the next years, from 2006 to 2015, the EU showed its resolve to peacefully settle the conflict via the E3/EU+3 format and consolidated its actorness employing a range of policy means compatible with Tocci's normativity criterion of legality. Parallel to negotiations, the EU implemented the UN sanctions, imposed several rounds of autonomous economic sanctions, and leveraged its Trade Cooperation Agreement as an incentive to persuade Iran to cooperate. The conclusion of the JCPOA recorded a great success story of the EU's "effective multilateralism" approach. The EU approach to conflict management seemingly accomplished real FP impacts as Iran was finally convinced to change its behaviour and accept limitations on its nuclear program. The risk of a probable US military intervention was removed, and diplomacy proved effective to address and solve proliferation risks.

However, after the US unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA followed by its policy of "maximum pressure on Iran", the EU's normative approach was put to the test again, this time a harder one, and exhibited both strength and vulnerability. The EU, along with other remaining parties to the Deal, condemned the US withdrawal and decided to save the agreement. This decision in itself could be interpreted as an achievement for the EUFP autonomous. The EU faced a situation of divergence between its norms and interests and the US FP choice and showed political determination to formulate and follow its own policy, as it meant more than a mere disagreement on the Iranian nuclear case and had to do with the "European strategic autonomy".

It seems, however, that the EU could not entirely internalise the costs of its political decision. Despite Iran's abiding by its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA and expecting to benefit from the Deal's economic advantages or at least getting some economic remedies to offset the adverse effects of the US sanctions on its hard-hit economy, the main European initiative, INSTEX, never fulfilled its announced objectives even in facilitating trade between Iran and European businesses that left the country after the re-imposition of the US sanctions. This is an interesting instance as it

falls within the scope of what is widely considered as the established strength of the EUFP, i.e. economic policy and external trade.

Unlike the 2006-2015 period when the EU could leverage its economic strength to persuade Iran to cooperate on its nuclear program and punished it with restrictive measures for non-cooperative behaviour, this time the EU faced difficulty to support its political will with economic instruments in the wake of the US withdrawal from the Deal, even after Iran started a policy of gradual suspension of its JCPOA commitments and the agreement was under the threat of a total collapse. The EU's *inaction* continued until the end of Trump's presidency and seriously questioned the EU's capability to act autonomously and effectively on the international scene in case of divergence between EU and US interests.

To properly assess the EUFP actorness, taking such inactions into account would be of great importance. Yet, neither the normative theoretical perspectives such as the NPE nor Tocci's normativity assessment framework offer insights into such complex situations of EU inaction. Regarding Tocci's framework, one may imply that its incapability of explaining the phenomenal inactions of the EUFP may partly refer to the fact that it is a general framework to conceptualise normative power and is not specifically calibrated to explain the EUFP, which is considered by many EU scholars as a *sui generis* system of policymaking. Yet, the NPE as a conceptual framework to explain the EUFP actorness, which claims that the EU *is* a normative construction that "predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics" (Manners, 2002, p. 252), does not meet the due expectation to shed some light on the EUFP cases of inaction such as the discussed one. Therefore, explaining the pathways and causes of the EUFP inaction, which has important implications for the current debate on "European strategic autonomy", could be a relevant subject for further research.

Conclusion

Perceiving the EU as a normative FP actor has strong support, both in the EU treaties and strategy documents, as well as in the EU theoretical perspectives such as the NPE notion. Promoting peace, democracy and the rule of law, respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms are among the major norms the EU follows inside the Union and in its relations with the broader world. Respecting international law with the central role of the UN, the EU has sought to attract international cooperation through its effective multilateralism doctrine. The assessment of the EU normative FP actorness on the Iranian nuclear profile based on Tocci's FP normativity framework showed that the EU's announced goal was mainly a normative one, i.e. making Iran comply with the international law norm of non-proliferation, followed by employing legally justifiable means compatible with the international law principles and the EU's multilateral approach. Yet, specifically during the 2003-2005 period, the E3/EU insistence on a legal interpretation that was closer to the US position than a legally justifiable interpretation compatible with the international community's reading of the NPT brought the EU actorness closer to the Imperial style of FP making. In the wake of the

US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, the EU continued diplomatic efforts together with the other parties to the JCPOA to save the agreement and showed political resolve to formulate its independent policy from the US on a major international security case. This was a great achievement for the normative EUFP actorness. Yet, when it came to internalise the costs of this political decision, the EU could not use its economic power and instruments to offset the effects of the US sanctions on Iran and keep it abiding by its commitments under the JCPOA, even when the whole agreement was on the brink of collapse. Such instances that reflect the influence of the US leadership on the EUFP showcase the salience of power relations in adopting foreign policies, as well as the limitations of the NPE notion to explain such outcomes in EUFP. In sum, the EU actorness on the Iranian nuclear profile since 2003 shows the capabilities and effectiveness of the EUFP on the one hand and reveals its vulnerability and weakness, most notably its *inaction* when action was required on the other hand. Seemingly, the US non-normative policies, including Realpolitik or Imperial styles of FP that stand in contrast with the EU normative ones, have so far functioned as an insurmountable obstacle in front of the normative EUFP actorness. Over time, the EU has shown greater determination to overcome such an obstacle and act more autonomously, without which solidifying European strategic autonomy would remain a far goal to reach.

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The Public Opinion of EU-Movers – Comparing Evaluations of EU Membership for Countries of Residence and Countries of Origin

Abstract

In the literature on public attitudes towards European integration, only a few studies have focused on EU citizens living in a different Member State than they were born in. While data on this specific group is rare, the pro-Europeanness of EU-movers has been taken for granted, given that they make active use of and, thus, profit from the right of free movement stemming from EU citizenship. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature in two ways. On the one hand, it investigates how EU-movers evaluate the benefits of EU membership of their country of origin as well as their country of residence. On the other hand, this paper compares movers' attitudes to those of natives in their country of residence as well as stayers in their country of origin and asks whether EU-movers trust the EU more and evaluate EU membership as more beneficial. Drawing on Eurobarometer data, the conducted logistic regressions reveal that EU-movers are more likely to trust the EU than stayers as well as natives. However, movers are less likely to positively evaluate EU membership of their country of origin than stayers.

Keywords: European integration, EU support, free movement, migration, public opinion

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Introduction

For more than a decade, the item most often selected by Europeans when answering the Eurobarometer survey question "What does the EU mean to you?" was "the Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU" (Recchi, 2015, p. 159). As asserted by citizens and scholars alike, free movement of people is considered as the cornerstone of EU citizenship that equipped European citizens with an indispensable set of rights, particularly with respect to work-related migration. While the share of EU-movers is marginal compared to the overall population – estimates assume around 3 to 4 % – they are symbolically referred to as "pioneers of European integration", as their life and experiences are "Europeanized" and, thus, contribute to the formation of a shared European public space (Favell and Recchi, 2009, p. 3).

However, compared to the burgeoning literature on public opinion towards European integration (Hobolt and de Vries, 2016), only very little is so far known about the attitudes those "pioneers of European integration" hold towards the EU. The few studies that have shed light on this subpopulation indeed find that intra-EU migrants tend to hold more pro-European views than stayers across different dimensions of "Europeanness", for example, regarding European identity (Rother and Nebe, 2009), support for EU membership (Kuhn, 2015) and further EU unification (Roeder, 2011).

Moreover, research has so far neither explicitly addressed the nexus between EU-movers and their actual evaluation of EU membership nor closely examined how movers diverge in comparison to their co-nationals in their country of origin as well as to natives in their country of residence. In this sense, this article contributes to the literature by, on the one hand, introducing a variable that captures movers' cost-benefit status in relation to their country of origin and residence's EU membership, and, on the other hand, by comparing not only movers to stayers but also movers to natives in their country of residence. Finally, to account for the different dimensions of EU support, this article compares citizens' evaluation of EU membership with a variable that captures respondents' trust in the EU.

By doing so, this paper argues that EU-movers, given that they tangibly benefit from EU citizen rights, should display more pro-European attitudes than stayers and natives. It is therefore expected that EU-movers are more likely to positively evaluate EU membership of their country of origin and country of residence, as well as to trust the EU. In addition, it is argued that commonly used socio-economic determinants, such as length of education, should matter less for movers' attitudes towards the EU, as migrating allows one to benefit from the EU independent of one's skill-levels. Whether these arguments can empirically be validated is relevant, both from a conceptual as well as a public policy perspective. Conceptually, the comparison of movers' attitudes towards different items of EU support speaks to the ongoing debate about the one- or multidimensionality of public opinion in the EU. As a result of the complex environment of EU politics and citizens' lack of information thereof, people's attitudes towards the EU are not well structured but reliant on broad heuristics (Anderson and Hecht, 2018; Pannico, 2017). However, as movers generally display greater knowledge about the EU,

they are expected to be more capable to specifically evaluate the EU in its own terms, which not only highlights the need to consider attitudes of different subgroups more systematically but also to scrutinise in greater detail the validity of commonly used survey items in EU-related public opinion research (Rother and Nebe 2009). Bringing more nuance into this debate also informs EU decision-makers about whether and to what extent the free movement of people regime is able to generate public support for the EU across these different dimensions (Schmidt 2013).

Starting with a two-part overview of the theoretical literature on movers' attitudes towards European integration and its key factors, this article enumerates different hypotheses on the questions at hand in chapter three. In the fourth part, the methodological choice of logistic regression models and some model specifications are elaborated upon. Additionally, various descriptive statistics are inspected, and the hypotheses empirically tested. Finally, this article is concluded by a discussion of the findings and their implications for future research on attitudes of EU-movers towards European integration.

Explaining Attitudes towards EU Integration

To explain individuals' attitudes towards European integration, the literature has largely focused on three sets of explanations, namely identity-driven, cue-taking and utilitarian approaches. The approach that gained most scholarly attention in recent years is the identity-driven approach. It is based on the assumption that people's views on European integration largely depend on their identities, since the EU not only revolves around the creation of a common single market, but also reinforces multiculturalism, diffuses norms of "us" and "them", and erodes national sovereignty (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, p. 423). Taken together, those studies show that people with multiple identities are more likely to endorse the process of European integration, whereas people with strong and excluding national identities consider further EU integration as a threat to them and, thus, hold negative attitudes towards the EU (Carey, 2002).

The cue-taking attempt assumes that European integration and institutions are too complex for most citizens to directly evaluate and emotionally attach themselves to. Therefore, they rely on heuristics in order to bridge information gaps (Hobolt and de Vries, 2016, p. 422). Cue-taking studies have focused on national proxies and intermediaries such as government performance, parties, and media coverage which shape people's attitudes towards the EU. For example, Anderson's (1998) national proxies model shows that as citizens' trust in their national governments increases, the more likely they are to take a positive stance towards the EU. Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that, when compared to uninformed citizens, citizens with distinct political knowledge rely less on cue-taking strategies (Karp et al., 2003).

Lastly, the utilitarian approach follows an economic cost-benefit logic of EU support that has for a long time dominated research, since, for the first forty years, the process of

European integration has mainly consisted of deeper economic cooperation and market integration (Hobolt and de Vries, 2016, p. 420). It views the formation of political attitudes as an outcome of rational calculations based on self-interests that are related to individual economic gains as well as to a more general feeling of social well-being (De Vries and Van Kersbergen, 2007, p. 312). The utilitarian approach is rooted in the literature on the "winners" and "losers" of globalisation, coined by the works of scholars such as Kriesi et al. (2008) and Hooghe and Marks (2009). Applied to the field of EU integration, the argument goes that the globalisation-cleavage is essentially underpinning attitudes towards the EU (Teney, Lacewell and De Wilde, 2013).

This means that particularly socio-economic factors, such as one's marketability skills and level of education, influence public support (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, p. 422). It is argued that, on an individual level, citizens with higher levels of education and income are more supportive of European integration as they have profited from European trade liberalisation (Gabel, 1998, p. 336). By contrast, the literature suggests that low-skilled workers and less educated people are less likely to benefit from the EU's market liberalisation, as it has led to higher competition in the labour market, pressures on the welfare state, and decreasing job security due to the relocation of production to low-wage countries (Ejrnæs and Jensen, 2019, p. 1393).

While the three approaches have proven very powerful in explaining public attitudes towards the EU, mainly due to a lack of data, only a few studies have looked at how they can explain the perceptions held by Europeans whose lives have been significantly influenced by the policies of the EU – namely those of EU-movers. Given the relatedness of free movement with the economic opportunities it opens, the utilitarian approach appears to be especially promising, as argued in the next section.

Free movement of People and Transnationalism in the EU

Before examining and comparing the attitudes of movers towards the EU, it is important to outline what differentiates free movers from the "normal" EU population, hereafter referred to as "stayers" in the movers' country of origin and "natives" in their country of residence. According to the Treaty of the EU, Article 45 grants EU citizens "the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States", including the right to work, access to work, as well as equal treatment at the workplace. Until today, millions of Europeans have made use of this right to work, live and study in another Member State. It is a core right of EU citizenship, with certain scholars going as far as stating that "free movement can be seen as the bedrock upon which the entire construction of European rights has been built" (Maas, 2008, p. 583). Next to achieving economic objectives, the free movement regime has given rise to the emergence of a European political community, in which Europeans are united beyond a single market but through a common status and common rights (Maas, 2007, p. 5).

How can the formation of a European community through the free movement of people regime be explained? In general, the literature distinguishes between two main

theoretical models: the culturalist research tradition and the transactionalist approach coined by Karl W. Deutsch. While the former emphasises the importance of early political socialisation and the exposure to symbols and discourses that convey an identitarian meaning, the latter focuses on the building of infrastructures that amplify "spatially connoted social interactions", which in turn will lead to the emergence of a collective identity (Recchi, 2014, p. 143). The transactionalist approach is considered to be more "bottom-up", as it puts the intensifying interaction between individuals within an emerging political community at the very heart of the formation process of the community's underlying identity. Deutsch's theory of transactionalism defines a nation as a "community of social communication" that is held together by a collective identity that is forged through intensifying social, political and economic transactions between its members (Deutsch, 1953, p. 70). In later years, Deutsch (1969) applied his theory of nationalism to the process of European integration, arguing that the same mechanism that built collective identities within nations can also lead to a common identification and shared trust across nations.

In her book "Experiencing European integration", Theresa Kuhn (2015), by drawing on Deutsch's transactionalist approach, identifies two mechanisms that link transnational activity to attitudinal change towards Europe, with one referring to group identities and the other to the evocation of utilitarian considerations. The first is based on the notion of intergroup contact, which assumes that a higher level of interaction "breeds familiarity, which in turn promotes the 'we-feeling' or attitudinal sympathy that Deutsch believed to be a key to success" (Jones and Van der Bjil, 2003, p. 1). The link between migration and the emergence of a European identity has received considerable scholarly attention, but its validity has also been questioned. Taking an ethnographic approach, Favell (2008) finds that although European identifications are more prevalent among intra-EU migrants than others, the identities they develop are primarily defined by the absence of an attachment to existing territorial ties. Rather than subsuming themselves within a European collective, identities of movers take "de-nationalised" forms of individualism. Methodologically, quantitative survey analysis on EU identity has been criticised for bearing the risk that "one forces opinions to be expressed on highly abstract matters which respondents have rarely engaged with and infers attitudes and beliefs which have barely formed" (White 2009, p. 699). Moreover, identity-driven approaches tend to encounter the problem of endogeneity, as the explanans (European identity) may either be influenced by the explanandum (EU support) or, in the case of movers, both may be jointly affected by the act of migrating to another EU Member State (Hobolt and de Vries, 2016, p. 421).

The second utilitarian argument deploys a narrower focus on the EU itself rather than on the more abstract concept of European identity. It states that transnational activity is a direct way to benefit from the EU, as the process of European integration has considerably reduced the transaction costs usually arising from cross-border interactions. Such transnational actions can, of course, vary in their degree of salience. They can range from border-free travelling and the cheaper purchase or tariff-free import of products to transactions that have a great impact on people's everyday life and

their biographies, such as the pursuit of an academic degree, the commencement of work or the set-up of a business in another Member State.

In addition, it is argued that the attitudes of those who are directly benefiting are also influenced indirectly, as the mere experience of benefiting will trigger a "learning process" that raises further awareness about the opportunities and goods provided by the EU. While those who engage in transactional activities are more likely to become more "Europeanised", those who abstain will remain "nationalised", as they do not benefit materially and are hence not seized by a learning process (Kuhn, 2015, p. 48). This also speaks to White's (2011) critique that European integration does not necessarily constitute European social spaces and forge political allegiances to the EU, as the EU faces difficulties in addressing the substantive concerns and views from its citizenry. In the case of EU-movers, the contrast between elites' discourse on the EU's usefulness for citizens' daily lives and its perceived lack of impact should be weaker. To summarise, citizens who engage in transnational interaction are expected to be more in favour of the EU, while those who do not are expected to be less in favour of the Union. This should be even more the case when comparing EU-movers with stayers, as migration can be considered as the most engaging and salient form of transnational action (Recchi, 2014, p. 124).

Accordingly, the few quantitative studies that tackled the issue confirm the notion that intra-EU migration and intensified transactional activity go hand in hand with a higher degree of European identification: In a comparative multivariate analysis measuring respondents attachment to Europe conducted by Recchi (2015, p. 133), the variable intra-EU mobility – coded as binary to distinguish between movers and stayers – turns out to be the most important predictor for a respondent's attachment to Europe. Moreover, the share of citizens expressing a strong attachment to Europe is higher than that of natives across all Member States, without any exception. Other studies have corroborated these findings. Rother and Nebe (2009) find that EU movers are generally more Europeanised than stayers, as they tend to have a better knowledge about the EU, hold a more positive image of the EU and also feel more attached to it.

Kuhn (2015, p. 68-72) tests the impact of individual transactional activities on two dependent variables, including, next to an item measuring European identity, a question which asks respondents to evaluate their countries EU membership as a "good" or a "bad thing". Her analysis shows that individual transnationalism, particularly those practices that involve long-term stays, has a substantively positive effect on EU identity and significantly increases the likelihood of an individual to endorse their country's EU membership. Except for Kuhn's (2015) study, most analyses have relied on items measuring the European identity of movers compared to those of stayers in their country of origin. This article aims to contribute to the mosaic of movers' attitudes towards European integration by introducing a dependent variable that captures movers' utilitarian cost-benefit calculations for the EU membership of both their country of origin as well as their country of residence. How the act of migrating possibly influences movers' EU membership evaluations is hypothesised in the following chapter.

Movers' Evaluation of EU Membership and Trust in the EU

The question of whether a country has benefited from EU membership asks respondents to concretely evaluate the costs and benefits of EU membership. It is used as an indicator capturing a crucial dimension of support for EU integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). As the considerations behind citizens' evaluation of EU membership can be manifold and nested in contexts specific to the different countries of origin and residence, it is a well-suited variable for the task of examining movers' multidimensional attitudes towards the EU.

While it is plausible that movers evaluate the consequences of EU membership as personally beneficial, but as non-beneficial for their country as a whole, a utilitarian approach would assume that the former outweighs the latter for the following two reasons: One the one hand, because the opportunities EU movers' benefit from can only be seized as a result of the country of origin's membership in the EU in the first place. On the other hand, because movers have actively made use of and therefore directly benefited from a right exclusively provided by the EU. The close linkage between personal and national benefit stemming from EU membership has been found in various public opinion studies on former as well as current accession countries: the prospect of working in another EU Member State and thus profiting personally from European integration is a key factor driving support for their country's EU membership (Arikan 2012; Doyle and Fidrmuc 2005; Guerra 2013). In this sense, the subpopulation which seized the opportunities that were a driving force behind their country's accession to the EU should also positively evaluate their country's EU membership in the aftermath.

As the data does not allow to control for stayers' transnational activities – such as past long-term stays in another EU country, participation in Erasmus or maintaining friendships across borders – the binary distinction between movers and stayers is suboptimal, especially for countries that are characterised by high in- and outward migration. However, given that free movement is still a rather recent and rarely practised phenomenon and represents a more salient experience than other transnational activities, the impact of these missing control variables should be negligible in a large sample as used in this study. Taken together, this article hypothesises that movers are expected to evaluate EU membership more positively than stayers:

> *H1a: Movers are more likely to respond that their country of origin has benefited from EU membership than stayers in the respective country of origin.*

Against the backdrop of the ongoing debate about the one- or multidimensionality of public attitudes towards the EU, this study introduces trust in the EU as another dependent variable to better understand the extent to which attitudes between movers and stayers diverge. Examining Eurobarometer data across several decades, Anderson and Hecht (2018) find that, over time, Europeans' attitudes form consistently around

one dominant, underlying dimension of EU support. If this applies to movers too, membership evaluation and trust in the EU are assumed to be highly correlated. But a growing literature highlights that citizens hold multidimensional, at times ambivalent preferences towards the EU, which systematically vary according to the specific question that is asked (Boomgaarden et al. 2011). Given that trust in the EU is a measure that captures diffuse EU support without any reference to the national level, it may well be that the divergence between movers and stayers is more pronounced than in the case of EU membership evaluation. Hence, for the reasons elaborated upon in the previous chapter, EU-movers are expected to trust the EU more than stayers do:

> *H1b: Movers are more likely to trust the EU than stayers in the respective country of origin.*

Next to countries of origin, the same argument should also apply to countries of residence, as natives in host societies, unlike EU-movers, are expected to be more "nationalised" too. This argument is reinforced by how EU-movers themselves perceive the benefits of their migration. Most likely, EU-movers view themselves as trained workers who contribute to the benefit of the country of residence, for example, by paying taxes rather than being a burden. Whether this view is reciprocally shared by natives, however, is more difficult to assess. While transactionalist intergroup theory would assume that interaction between movers and stayers would trigger learning effects among both groups, host societies tend to react in a more polarised way to higher levels of intra-EU migration.

As outlined above, certain segments of a host society can perceive EU integration and free movement of people as a cultural threat and more competition on the labour market, as well as for public services and social benefits. Even though studies on the nexus of high levels of migration and Euroscepticism display mixed results, there is strong evidence that high EU net migration has led to public backlashes against the EU in certain countries, such as in the United Kingdom or Switzerland (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017; Sarrasin, Kuhn and Lancee, 2018). Although this study does not aim to make any claims on this complex linkage, as it does not control for the differences in the amount of intra-EU migrants living in recipient states, it can still be concluded from the arguments discussed above that movers are more likely to appraise their country of residence's EU membership as beneficial, while natives are less likely to do so:

> *H2a: Movers are more likely to respond that their country of residence has benefited from EU membership than natives in the respective country of residence.*

To compare movers' EU membership evaluation with diffuse EU support, the trust variable is also tested for countries of residence, with the same effect as hypothesised above:

H2b: Movers are more likely to trust the EU than natives in the respective country of residence.

Lastly, this paper further examines the effect of a person's educational attainment, which is generally considered to be positively related to attitudes towards the EU. The reason why is that well-educated people often experience a longer exposure to cosmopolitan ideas and tolerant worldviews and, due to their "human capital" and "transnational competencies", can better use the freedoms as well as job and investment opportunities provided by the European single market (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006, p. 472-474). Concerning free movers, however, the effect of education may be mitigated for mainly two reasons.

First, while it is true that in the early years, the right to free movement was mainly used by well-educated Europeans (Favell 2008), Eastern enlargement has altered this pattern, as the population of movers did not only significantly grow but became socioeconomically also more diverse, with the share of low- and medium-educated EU-movers increasing (Recchi, 2015, p. 58). Even though movers from Central and Eastern Europe are often over-qualified for the jobs they take up and therefore witness social downward in parallel to upward economic mobility (Recchi, 2015, p. 70), they profit from mobility regardless of their educational or occupational status. The argument goes that the dividing cleavage between "winners" and "losers" of EU integration has become more blurred among movers, as the effect of the socio-economic class is moderated by the fact that mobile individuals "benefit from (European) unification regardless of their skill level" (Roeder, 2011, p. 462).

Second, it is argued that for well-educated Europeans, moving to another country does not have a significant impact on their identification with Europe because they tend to already hold a pronounced pro-European outlook. In a longitudinal analysis on EU attitudes of Erasmus students conducted by Kuhn (2012), it is shown that studying abroad barely changes students' European identity, as they are already likely to feel European before starting an Erasmus semester. In turn, Kuhn concludes that transactionalist practices exert a stronger impact in fostering European identity among less-educated Europeans. This article tests whether intra-EU migrations can serve as "a substitute for education in producing a sense of proximity" to Europe (Recchi, 2015, p. 142) when accounting for utilitarian considerations, arguing that the effect of education is weaker among movers than among stayers and natives:

H3: The interaction effect of length of education and being a mover on the evaluation of EU membership is negative.

Data and Method

The analysis is based on the data from the Post-Electoral Survey Among European Expatriates, carried out between 12 June and 2 July 2019. This special survey was

conducted at the request of the European Parliament, after a study has revealed that in the European Elections of 2014, around 95 % of EU expatriates did not vote in their country of residence and that participation has, depending to a large extent on the voting laws in the country of origin (Ferrari, Pavone and Gjergji 2019). To better assess the attitudes movers hold towards the EU as well as their voting behaviour, the survey targeted the twelve nationalities with the highest number of expatriates, which are Romanian, Portuguese, Polish, Dutch, Hungarians, Croatian, Italian, French, Spanish, Greek, German and Bulgarian nationals, living in eleven countries of residence.

The poll contains only data of movers, yielding a total of 8,617 respondents who completed the survey. Despite the large differences between the numbers of respondents for each target nationality, the composition largely reflects the actual size of the expatriate population. The greatest number of completed questionnaires were received from Romanian (2,703), Polish (1,327) and Bulgarian (1,012) respondents, and the least number from respondents of Spanish (220) and Dutch (168) origin. For reasons of representativeness and comparability with stayers, this study considered only expat-populations with a sample size above 300, which in this survey counts for movers from Romania, Poland, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal, leading to a total sample size of 7,537 respondents.

One remark on how the sample was collected. Respondents were targeted through Facebook adverts that linked interested users directly to the survey. These adverts were based on the country of residence indicated on a person's Facebook profile, for example, Germany, as well as on the language the person is using on Facebook, for example, Romanian or French.

To compare the attitudes of movers with those of stayers and because the survey items used were not identical, the expat survey was combined with data of two other Eurobarometer surveys that were conducted in the same period. The first is the Standard Eurobarometer Survey 91.2, which was carried out between 7 June and 1 July 2019 in 34 European countries, containing a sample size of 34,011 respondents aged 15 and older. The second is the general Post-Electoral Survey of the European Parliament, with the fieldwork carried out from 7 to 26 June 2019, containing 27,464 Europeans aged 15 from all 28 Member States. Each of the two surveys was subset into two new data sets, one containing only respondents from movers' country of origin and the other respondents from their country of residence.

The dependent variables of interest are two survey questions. The first question asks respondents if they "tend to trust or tend not to trust these institutions", listing, inter alia, the EU. Answers indicating "tend not to trust" are coded as "0", while the value "1" is assigned to respondents who "tend to trust" the EU. The second set of questions asks whether their country of origin, as well as the country of residence, has "benefited" or "not benefited" from "being a member of the EU". The question is coded "0" if respondents consider their country of origin or residence has not benefited and "1" if it is considered to have benefited. Due to the binary nature of the dependent variables, logistic regressions are chosen to model the predicted probabilities. It should be noted that the two dependent variables of the expat survey are spread across two different

surveys: while the EU-benefit question is only included in the general post-electoral survey, the EU-trust variable was only featured in the Standard Eurobarometer Survey 91.2.

Regarding the explanatory variables, a binary mover-variable differentiates movers from stayers, taking the value "1" for all the respondents from the expat survey and "0" for the other two surveys. The duration of a mover's stay in the country of residence is measured on a four-point scale, with the value "1" corresponding to two years or less, "2" to three to five years, "3" to six to ten years, and "4", corresponding to eleven years or more. To account for the influence of socio-economic characteristics, length of education is measured by a respondent's age until he or she remained in education, coded in a five-point scale, ranging from "no full-time education" (1), less than 15 years (2), to 16-19 years (3), "still studying" (4) and more than 20 years (5). Finally, respondents' age and gender are included as control variables.

Results

The results of this study are presented in two steps and start with the inspection of descriptive statistics. Looking first at trust in the EU, Table 1 illustrates that in five out of seven countries, movers show higher levels of trust than stayers do in their country of origin. For the countries of residence, the pattern is similar but with more pronounced differences between movers and natives. The only country where natives show a higher level of trust than movers is Belgium. Trust in the EU is highest among movers who live in countries where natives show particularly very low levels of trust, namely in Italy (60% compared to 37%) and the UK (62% to 29%).

The results for evaluation of EU membership are displayed in Figure 2 and are surprising for the countries of origin. Apart from Italy, the share of movers who indicate that their country of origin has benefited from EU membership is consistently lower than the respective share of stayers. An opposite picture emerges for the countries of residence, where the proportion of movers claiming that their country of residence has benefitted is on a high level. In Italy and the UK, the attitudes of movers and natives are again furthest apart, with 70% of movers compared to 42% of natives in Italy and 79% to 58% in the UK responding that their country has benefited from EU membership. On average, the share of movers' positive membership evaluations for their country of origin is 64% compared to 74% for their country of residence.

Figure 2: Share of EU-Movers and Stayers/Natives trusting the EU, grouped by Country of Origin/Residence.


Figure 1: Share of EU-Movers and Stayers/Natives who say their Country of Origin/Residence has benefitted from EU Membership, grouped by Country of Origin/Residence.

Coming to the statistical analysis, the results for movers only are displayed in Table 1. In line with the utilitarian theory, the effect of length of education is significantly positive across all three dependent variables, meaning that among movers, those with a higher level of education are still more likely to trust the EU, as well as to positively evaluate EU membership of their country of origin and residence. About the length of stay, there is a statistically significant negative effect on whether a country of residence has benefitted from EU membership or not: the longer movers stay in their country of residence, the more likely they become to negatively evaluate the benefits of EU membership. One explanation for this effect could be the feeling of a "EUphoria" among movers, which is strong at the time of arrival but fades as times passes and certain expectations about the benefits of migrating may have given way to reality. Another explanation could be that attitudes of movers simply adapt to the views held by the majority of natives, which, as seen below, tend to be less positive than those of movers. Favell (2008, p. 182) finds this phenomenon to be particularly common among EU-movers living in the UK.

The odds ratios in Table 2 also show that the effect of education is slightly stronger for countries of residence, which indicates that differences among movers' length of education matter more for their evaluation of the benefits for countries of residence than for countries of origin.

Table 1: Results of Logistic Regressions of EU-Movers.

Model 1:	Country of Residence benefited	Country of Origin benefited	Trust in EU
Intercept	2.194***	0.422**	0.451**
	(0.190)	(0.147)	(0.140)
Length of Stay	-0.214***	0.023	-0.047
	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Length of Education	0.110***	0.141***	0.106***
	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Gender	-0.152*	0.292***	0.284***
	(0.073)	(0.061)	(0.057)
Age	-0.044	-0.051	-0.084**
	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.030)
AIC	5029.635	6823.329	7381.375
BIC	5063.068	6856.703	7414.577
Log Likelihood	-2509.817	-3406.664	-3685.688
Deviance	5019.635	6813.329	7371.375
Num. obs.	5924	5854	5656

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

Table 2: Odds Ratios of Model 1 Logistic Regressions of EU Movers

Model 1:	Odds: Country of Origin benefited	Odds: Country of Residence benefited	Odds: Trust in EU
Length of Stay	1.02	0.81	0.95
Length of Education	1.15	1.11	1.11
Gender	1.34	0.86	1.34
Age	0.95	0.96	0.92

Turning to the logistic regression analysis of movers and stayers and their evaluation of EU membership of their countries of origin, the results offer a puzzling picture. In the model without the interaction term (Table 7, Annex), the statistically significant negative effect of being a mover implies that movers, on average, are less likely to

positively evaluate the consequences of EU membership for their country of origin compared to those who live in the respective country. This falsifies *H1a*, which assumes the effect of being a mover to be positive.

However, when the effect of being a mover is interacted with the effect of length of education (Table 5), the effect of being a mover fades, meaning that they do not significantly differ in their evaluation compared to those of stayers. By contrast, the marginal effect of a higher level of education becomes smaller for movers compared to the effect of the variable for stayers. This confirms the third hypothesis, which states that the effect of length of education on the evaluation of EU membership is mitigated when individuals have made use of their right of free movement: the gap between the high-educated and low-educated regarding the evaluation of benefits is lower among movers than among stayers.

Looking at the results for the countries of residence (Table 4), we find clear support for hypothesis *H2a,* which states that EU-movers are more likely to evaluate their country of residence' EU membership more positively than natives. In substantive terms, the odds ratio shows that when switching from stayers to movers, the odds of evaluating EU membership positively increases by a factor of 2.96. The effect of length of education is, again, statistically significant and positive. The analysis also confirms *H3*, as the marginal effect of education on the dependent variable decreases for movers compared to stayers. In fact, the interaction effect turns out to be even stronger for the countries of residence compared to the countries of origin.

Table 3: Results of Logistic Regressions and Odds Ratios of EU-Movers and Stayers.

Model 2:	Country of Origin benefited	Odds Ratios
Intercept	0.403^{**}	1.50
	(0.125)	
Mover	0.114	1.12
	(0.137)	
Length of Education	0.269^{***}	1.31
	(0.027)	
Education*Mover	-0.100^{**}	0.91
	(0.037)	
Gender	0.142^{***}	0.94
	(0.042)	
Age	-0.061^{**}	1.15
	(0.019)	
AIC	13669.872	
BIC	13714.411	

Log-Likelihood	-6828.936
Deviance	13657.872
Num. obs.	12371

$^{***}p < 0.001, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 4: Results of Logistic Regressions and Odds Ratios of EU-Movers and Natives.

Model 3:	Country of Residence benefited	Odds Ratios
Intercept	0.210^{**}	1.50
	(0.073)	
Mover	1.084^{***}	2.96
	(0.120)	
Length of Education	0.318^{***}	1.37
	(0.014)	
Education*Mover	-0.200^{***}	0.82
	(0.031)	
Gender	0.023	1.02
	(0.029)	
Age	-0.018	0.98
	(0.012)	
AIC	30774.378	
BIC	30824.429	
Log-Likelihood	-15381.189	
Deviance	30762.378	
Num. obs.	31004	

$^{***}p < 0.001, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 5: Results of Logistic Regressions of EU-Movers, Stayers and Natives for Trust in EU.

Model 4:	Country of Origin Trust in EU	Country of Residence Trust in EU
Intercept	-0.462**	-1.206***
	(0.144)	(0.124)
Mover	1.094***	1.726***
	(0.129)	(0.121)
Length of Education	0.207***	0.309***
	(0.023)	(0.018)
Education*Mover	0.100**	0.045
	(0.038)	(0.034)
Gender	-0.104***	-0.069***
	(0.016)	(0.014)
Age	-0.098**	-0.199***
	(0.034)	(0.031)
AIC	15641.984	19921.155
BIC	15686.230	19966.949
Log-Likelihood	-7814.992	-9954.577
Deviance	15629.984	19909.155
Num. obs.	11781	15252

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table 6: Odds Ratios of Model 4 Logistic Regressions of EU Movers, Stayers and Natives.

Model 4:	Odds: Country of Origin Trust in EU	Odds: Country of Residence Trust in EU
Mover	2.98	5.61
Length of Education	1.23	1.36
Education*Mover	0.91	0.82
Gender	1.10	1.04
Age	0.90	0.93

Turning to the variable on trust in the EU, Model 4 confirms *H1b* as well as *H2b*: movers are significantly more likely to trust the EU than stayers and natives. The effect is considerable, as the odds of trusting the EU increase by a factor of nearly 3 when comparing movers to stayers and over 5 in comparison to natives (Table 6). The substantial difference supports the assumption that EU-movers are more Europeanised as a result of their salient transnational experiences. Length of education remains a strong predictor, while the interaction effect does not seem to close the "education-gap" among movers but rather widen it marginally.

Overall, the results only partially confirm the hypotheses developed in the theory part. For hypotheses *H1a* and *H2a*, the evidence is mixed, as movers are indeed more likely to positively evaluate the benefits coming with EU membership for their country of residence but less likely to do so when it comes to their country of origin. How can this

supposedly paradoxical result be explained? Firstly, as shown by the summary statistics, movers tend to make a clear difference between their country of residence and origin when evaluating the benefits of EU membership, with positive evaluations of the latter being on average ten percentage points lower compared to those of the former. This finding alone deserves more extensive research.

Secondly, when taking into account the two interaction effects, the picture becomes even more complex. While in both cases, the marginal effect of the length of education is weaker for movers than for natives and stayers – confirming *H3* – it is even weaker for movers' evaluation of their country of residence. The same accounts for the first model, where the factor of length of education shows lower odds for countries of residence than for countries of origin. Thus, the results indicate that the "education gap" becomes smaller when movers evaluate the benefits of EU membership for their country of residence compared to their country of origin. By contrast, with regard to trust in the EU, the education effect does not seem to vary for movers.

Thirdly, the statistically significant and substantial difference in the trust that movers display in comparison to stayers and natives indicates that movers do not conflate different dimensions of EU support. This speaks to the findings by Roder and Nebe (2009), who argue that EU-movers have a better knowledge about the EU and thus, also display more informed and fine-grained attitudes. It also shows that movers' attitudes towards the EU clearly stand out from those held by a majority of stayers and especially those by natives. Unlike the general population, movers tend to show relative rather than absolute preferences for the EU.

Finally, how can a utilitarian approach accommodate these results? A straightforward explanation appears to be that movers consider the usually higher standards of living and the greater economic opportunities in their country of residence as a consequence of the country's EU membership. Furthermore, as outlined in the theoretical part, movers may perceive the benefits for their country of residence as a result of their (and others) migration, as they view themselves as an educated workforce that contributes to the growth of the economy and pays taxes. For the very same reasons, movers may conclude that their country of origin, being deprived by the same talented workforce and taxpayers in whose education it invested, has been disadvantaged from EU membership. Following this line of argument, the first two points account for why movers believe that their country of residence has benefitted from EU membership, while the third point hints to an explanation for why movers respond that their country of origin has not benefitted from EU membership.

Conclusion

This study has contributed to the literature on EU public opinion by, on the one hand, investigating the attitudes of EU-movers towards the benefits of EU membership for their country of residence and origin and, on the other hand, by comparing movers'

attitudes to those of natives in their country of residence as well as stayers in their country of origin.

The logistic regressions conducted reveal that even though movers are more likely to positively evaluate EU membership of their country of residence than natives, they are less likely to do so for their country of origin when compared to stayers. Moreover, the logistic regressions ran on the question of trust in the EU reveal that movers are clearly more likely to trust the EU than stayers and, particularly, natives. This finding is in line with previous research and confirms the notion that movers hold more pro-European attitudes than stayers and/or natives, at least as long as the dependent variable of interest touches upon more individual and diffuse dimensions of Europeanness. Clearly, EU-movers also differentiate between different dimensions of EU support and disentangle the national benefits of EU membership benefits from their own benefits, as well as from their general view of the EU.

Hence, the observed yet unexpected difference between movers and stayers can be attributed to the particular dimension of Europeanness that the dependent variable captures, namely that it asks respondents to concretely evaluate whether their country – and not themselves – has benefitted from EU membership. While it has been argued in this article that, from a utilitarian perspective, this difference could be bridged as movers transpose their personal benefits to the country-level, this does not seem to be the case.

By contrast, the results show the explanatory limits of the utilitarian approach, which finds it hard to account for the finding that movers are less likely to say that their country of origin has benefitted from EU membership than stayers, while it is arguably mainly the movers themselves who have benefitted from their country's EU membership. Instead, movers seem to evaluate the benefits of EU membership also beyond their personal benefits, by including other, context-specific indicators which are relatable to the effects of EU membership in their country of origin, such as the state of the economy and the labour market, but also the quality of living, into their assessment. Another aspect that could influence movers' answers more negatively is that they compare these indicators with the situation in their country of residence, which they tend to evaluate more positively.

This links to one of the main shortcomings of this study, which is that it did not examine the interplay between individual and contextual variables, although the dependent variable clearly evokes considerations among respondents that are nested in specific national contexts. Conclusively, for future research, this implies focusing on both the differences in attitudes between movers, stayers and natives, as well as how these differences diverge across the Member States and their diverse macro-economic and political contexts. In particular, more research ought to be done on the empirical puzzle posed by movers diverging views on the benefits of EU membership for their country of origin and residence: What motivates the more negative evaluations of the former, and a more positive assessment in case of the latter?

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Informal Coalitions and Leadership in the European Union's Foreign Policy - Making Foreign Policy through Informal Governance

Abstract

Informal coalitions are a regular tool of Member States (MS) of the European Union (EU) to overcome the rigid formal decision-making structure in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In some cases, these informal coalitions act *in the name of the EU but outside the formal CFSP process*. Functional explanations, dominant in the literature, cannot sufficiently explain who leads these coalitions and why other MS accept this leadership. The article, therefore, tests the theoretical predictions of distributive-bargaining and sociological institutionalism in two central processes of EU foreign policymaking: the non-proliferation negotiations with Iran and the resolution of the Ukraine crisis. The article finds that distributive-bargaining institutionalism cannot be disregarded in the explanation *by who* these groups are created, but that sociological institutionalism can better explain MS behaviour *after* an informal leadership group has been set up and the acceptance of informal coalitions by other MS, which supports a more supranational reading of the CFSP.

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Introduction

When the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine met in the Normandy Format in Paris on December 9th, 2019, it was not only their countries' respective flags waving in the background. Also hanging there was that of the European Union (EU). This is surprising, given that the EU is not a party to the talks. In this symbolic way, France and Germany participate in the name of the EU, even though their participation in the Normandy Format is not integrated into the formal structures of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Even though such informal coalitions frequently arise in the EU's CFSP, our theoretical understanding of them is limited. The literature on informal coalitions has rightly identified functional explanations as a crucial contributing factor to the emergence of informal coalitions. The rigid formal structure of the CFSP decision-making process creates what has variously been described as a "leadership paradox" (Aggestam and Johansson 2017) or a "leadership dilemma" (Hill 2010), as leadership remains highly fragmented and diffuse in all steps of the policy cycle.

In agenda-setting, both the Commission and Member States (MS) have a right of initiative. Policy formulation tends towards no or lowest-common-denominator decisions as the intergovernmental structure of CFSP decision-making grants each MS a veto. Implementation is also shared by the EU and MS, with the EU often relying on MS' capacities and capabilities. External representation is the responsibility of several EU officials – the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP [Vice-President of the Commission]), but also the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council (recently exemplified by #sofagate), while MS also maintain their representatives and diplomatic structures.

To formulate and implement foreign policy in this rigid formal structure, MS often opt for informal coalitions for sharing information, voting, and lobbying together. In some cases, as with France's and Germany's seats at the Normandy Format table, these coalitions operate *outside of the formal constraints* of the CFSP decision-making process in the Council of the European Union (hereinafter the Council). Such cases are theoretically challenging, and functional explanations alone cannot sufficiently explain *how the composition and effectiveness of informal leadership groups* develop. Why would these MS be part of the coalition? Why would the other MS accept to lose their say in the formulation, and potential veto against the adoption, of policy in highly sovereignty-related foreign policy (Chapter 2)?

To address this research gap, this paper contrasts the explanatory value of rationalist and sociological institutionalist theory for the intra-EU dynamics at play in such instances of policy effectuation through informal leadership. Power-based rationalist institutionalism understands the move towards informal governance as an expression of the relative power of MS. Those MS outside the leadership coalition accept the dominance of the most powerful MS in exchange for their relatively larger-than-size power (the veto) under formal conditions. Sociological explanations emphasise the intersubjective process of role formation by which those MS in the informal coalition

continuously make their leadership legitimate by "doing a good job", demonstrating commitment and capability, and respecting (and negotiating) red lines of other MS (Chapter 3).

Two CFSP cases are then subjected to this analysis, the non-proliferation negotiations with Iran and the EU response to the Ukraine crisis. These cases are chosen for their high political and economic salience, which means that (almost) all MS have strong national interests, which makes their acceptance of an informal leadership coalition particularly challenging. The paper finds that while relative power was an important factor in the composition of the informal coalition – France, Germany, and the UK; and France and Germany, respectively. After the informal leadership group is incepted, however, a continuous process of leadership role formation develops, other MS request to be more involved, channels of communication are created, commitment is displayed actively, leadership is legitimised (Chapter 4).

The paper concludes that while power-based explanation cannot be fully disregarded when explaining who assumes policy leadership in self-selected groups, the coalitions relate to other MS much in the way sociological institutionalism would predict. This lends credibility to a more supranational reading of the CFSP but also invites further research into the interplay of material and ideational factors on leadership formation in the EU's foreign policy (Chapter 5).

Informal Leadership Coalitions in the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Informal coalitions in CFSP

The CFSP policymaking process consists of a "multitude of actors with diverging interests and instruments in specific foreign policy dossiers" (Justaert and Keukeleire 2012, 444). To navigate complicated negotiations, coalition building is one of the central tactics MS employ (next to lobbying or mediating through good office, for instance) (Grøn and Wivel 2011; Nasra 2011). In these informal networks, MS cooperate by sharing information, expertise, voting jointly, and coordinating their lobbying efforts towards other MS.

In this sense, informal coalition-building is a constant feature of the CFSP process. The Benelux or the Baltic countries (Vilpišauskas 2011; Vilson 2015) as well as the Visegrad group (Dangerfield 2012; Marton 2012; Vilson 2015) regularly coordinate their positions to amplify their influence on CFSP outcomes. Similarly, groups of "like-minded countries", informal coalitions of states who seek to change a certain policy – employ informal coalition-building as a tactic within the formal CFSP decision-making framework. This has been the case with the coalition led by the Nordic countries to advance the inclusion of gender into EU development policy (Elgström 2017) or to enhance the civilian capabilities within the CFSP (Jakobsen 2009). These informal

coalitions, however, operate within the formal CFSP decision-making process and do not assume leadership of the EU's foreign policy process.

Informal leadership coalitions

An informal coalition becomes an informal *leadership* group when it "no longer put[s] [its] services at the disposal of the Council" but at the same time determines European policy (Delreux and Keukeleire 2017, 1481). As they go beyond the formal process, their starting point is not through a delegation by a vote of the Council, but the result of a process of self-selection into the group of those that possess "particular interests, expertise or capability" (Delreux and Keukeleire 2017, 1480). They also have an open and potentially evolving participation – if another actor invests political capital into participating in the group – and they focus on a specific policy issue (Delreux and Keukeleire 2017).

One can, therefore, define informal leadership groups as a *self-selected group of MS that decides on European foreign policy (exercises leadership) outside of the formal CSSP process on a specific policy issue*. They become *effective* when their leadership is accepted by the other MS, and their informal leadership receives formal consent. Effectiveness is thus understood here not as productivity or policy success but rather as the successful assumption of CFSP leadership of an informal coalition. Such cases are well-suited for the present analysis for two reasons. On the one hand, the informal leadership processes that are constantly in play in CFSP negotiations are difficult to observe without being present at the negotiations themselves but become visible when they materialise outside the negotiations (Delreux and Van den Brande 2010). On the other hand, the relationship between MS is particularly challenging to explain in cases where some give up their institutional prerogatives in favour of others.

While leadership through such self-selected groups is an important phenomenon in the CFSP, it has "largely escaped the radar of EU foreign policy scholars" (Delreux and Keukeleire 2017, 1471). The research agenda of Delreux, Keukeleire, and Justaert is a marked exception to that rule. Their work on the Contact Groups on Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo highlights the functional benefits of these constellations, as they allow the EU to act in a field where otherwise it might not have taken action (Keukeleire 2007, Justaert and Keukeleire 2012).

This positive functional evaluation is shared by other authors (Everts 2001), which suggest to "embrace the trend towards ad hoc coalitions" (Puglerin 2019, 13). The Council itself has recognised that "[v]ariable actions and formats [by various groups of MS] can only strengthen the EU's global role [...]" (General Secretariat of the Council, cited in Bassiri Tabrizi 2018, 68). While some also warn against the potentially corroborative effects informal coalitions can have on a meaningful CFSP, as MS pick-and-choose when to work through the EU framework and when not to (Lehne 2017), the analysis generally rests on functional explanations and arguments.

While these accounts rightly stress the importance of functional explanations in the development, functional explanations alone cannot explain why other MS would accept such informal leadership coalitions. Even in the "core groups" analysed by Delreux et al., where other MS demonstrated limited commitment to the policy issues at hand, they tried to get a seat at the table (Keukeleire 2007). Why would other MS allow informal coalitions to overcome the functional difficulties at their expense?

Why would those MS outside the coalition forego their formal right to veto any policies that infringe on their national interest? A better theoretical understanding of these processes also interlinks with the discussion on the intergovernmental vs supranational character of CFSP. A power-based approach, which sees informality as a way for the powerful MS to "get their way", would indicate a stronger intergovernmental character for the CFSP. Sociological theories, which emphasise mutually constitutive processes of leadership role formation, would lend credibility to a more supranational characterisation of the CFSP. The next section, therefore, presents these two respective theories and presents the case selection.

Theory

When analysing informal leadership coalition, MS can be divided along a central line: those within the coalition and those outside of it. This applies equally to the European institutions – they may be involved in an informal leadership group, or they may not be included at all. On what basis does the self-selection process of a leadership coalition take place? And, for those outside the group: Why do other MS accept this leadership, even though they lose their formal prerogatives to influence policy outcomes? The answers suggested by rational-choice and sociological theories vary significantly.

Rational-choice institutionalist theory understands MS as utility-maximising rational actors for which formal rules are always incomplete and can be adjusted if required by the circumstances (Aggestam and Johansson 2017; Gegout 2010). One form of rational-choice institutionalism is functional institutionalism, which describes informality as a functional necessity to overcome cooperation problems (Reh et al. 2013). A functional explanation may well explain *why* informal coalitions may arise under the institutional structure of CFSP when only a few MS are interested in a specific foreign policy matter – then these MS cooperate informally to solve the cooperation problem. It has difficulty accounting for informal leadership coalitions on policy issues where most or all MS have strong interests – other MS would hardly accept their interests side-lined as a solution to the cooperation problem.

A more insightful rational institutionalist theory for the present analysis may be distributive bargaining theory, which emphasises the role of power as a driver of informality. Stressing that going informal generally benefits the more powerful actors, it describes the balance between formal and informal arrangements as a result of the disagreement between States and their relative power position to one another (Roger 2020). The smaller States accept that the larger State(s) circumvent the formal process

on some occasions in return for their stronger relative weight in the formal setting (Kleine 2014; Stone 2011).

Applied to informal leadership coalitions, the theory would suggest that it is the powerful states who assume leadership at the expense of other MS and the EU institutions. Other MS accept the leadership as part of a larger bargain – they enjoy relatively more formal power in unanimity voting at normal times, which provides a payoff for accepting leadership by the powerful states in extraordinary circumstances. Such a bargain, however, would not necessarily apply to the EU institutions. One should expect the EU institutions to have a strong preference for formal CFSP processes or to try to be a member of the informal coalition and avoid being side-lined.

Sociological theories, on the other hand, emphasise the importance of norms and expectations to determine the actions of individual states. Sociological institutionalism argues that the choice repertoire of agents is determined by mutual and co-constitutive socialisation processes which accord certain roles and identities to individual actors, thereby determining the range of behaviour that is available to them (Adler-Nissen 2014). Through repeated interaction with and within the European institutions, it becomes appropriate for certain MS to assume a leadership role in a specific policy issue (Reh et al. 2013).

The composition and existence of a leadership group would then result from an intersubjective process of role formation – which would be continuously ongoing throughout the policymaking process –, where those MS that demonstrate their ability on the policy issue are allowed to take up leadership to influence and guide the policy outcome. In other words, through capabilities, commitment, demonstration of good office, and justified interest, MS' leadership is *legitimised* (Aggestam and Johansson 2017). Through the same process of role formation, the EU institutions may also be involved if they are perceived as legitimate by the other MS.

Other MS accept this leadership role because of the legitimate prevalence of the MS in the leadership coalition, but also because they recognise that the leading States behave in the appropriate manner that takes into account the red lines and broad policy interests of the other MS. These processes would be observable in the arguments between the leading and non-leading MS, and the base upon which these arguments are made.

Operationalisation

Distributive bargaining and sociological institutionalism predict significantly different behaviour when it comes to informal leadership coalitions in CFSP, both for the composition of the coalition and the observable behaviour between the coalition and other MS. Distributive bargaining institutionalism interprets informality as a way for powerful MS to circumvent formal procedures in extraordinary times. As such, one would expect the most powerful MS (particularly France, Germany, and the UK, which

are significantly larger than other MS) to be present in the informal coalitions. Through a sociological lens, participation would not be determined by capability but by leadership credibility, demonstrated through good office and commitment. The (evolving) participation in the informal coalitions can be readily observed.

The other MS would, according to distributive bargaining theory, accept the leadership by the powerful MS in exchange for their relative weight in formal times. In so far, they would accept the powerful MS's speaking for the EU out of necessity and be motivated to comply by reference to their relative lack of power and capability. The sociological lens would predict a more dynamic process in which the leadership position is negotiated. Here, other MS would more likely demand participation and involvement, and they would be motivated to comply by demonstration of balanced positions, being taken into account, and commitment by the leading MS. These dynamics are also observable in positions taken and reasons given by the respective governments, often documented by secondary sources, as well as in the first-hand reports and primary sources from EU officials (Cronberg 2017; Middelaar 2019).

Case selection

These manifestations are most likely to be observable (and the most interesting, theoretically) in those cases in which all MS have a strong interest and where, therefore, functional explanations have the least explanatory value. In such cases, a functional institutionalist reduction of seats at the table is not an option. While the precise criteria of such issues are hard to define, two of the central CFSP issues of the last twenty years were and are effected through informal leadership coalitions: the EU-Iran negotiations and the Franco-German presence in the Normandy talks with Russia and Ukraine. In either case, the relative size (in (geo)political and economic terms) means that (almost) all MS have an interest in participating in the formulation of policy. As such, the development of informal leadership coalitions in these cases is particularly challenging to explain.

Additionally, these cases allow for a good evaluation of the success of an informal leadership coalition. In both cases, the policy pursued by the leading MS included EU sanctions on Iran and Russia, respectively. Sanctions re-arm other MS with a potential veto, as decisions on sanctions need to be taken unanimously. This potentially allows non-leading MS to block the policy of the informal coalition. Successfully pursuing joint EU sanctions provides a litmus test for the informal leadership coalition, demonstrating the effectiveness of leadership (in determining joint policy in the name of the EU). These cases are therefore selected for the analysis.

Before presenting said case analysis, a caveat with regards to the timeframe of the selected cases is in order. The Iran negotiations started in 2003 and ended with the signing of the JCPOA in 2015. The Ukraine crisis erupted in 2014, and the Normandy Format is ongoing. The institutional framework has changed over this time – the Lisbon Treaty introduced the EU's own external action service, there have been enlargements

in 2004, 2007, and 2013. This may create difficulty for the comparability of the two cases over such a wide timespan. Such concerns cannot fully be remedied. However, the general intergovernmental nature of CFSP remained under the Lisbon Treaty, and both examples take mostly place after the largest of the enlargements in 2004. Tendentially, enlargement would make formal decision-making under unanimity more inefficient, therefore favouring the behaviour this paper seeks to observe.

Case analyses

EU-Iran negotiations (2003-2015)

The initiative to take up negotiations with Iran was a direct response to the Iranian nuclear infrastructure becoming public knowledge, and the initiative was taken by the Foreign Ministries of Germany, the UK, and France, without consulting or even notifying the European institutions or other MS (Sauer 2019). Shortly after, however, they were joined in the Iran negotiations by the High Representative (HR/VP). Even after failed talks with Iran and the transfer of the Iran nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), all four parties remained centrally involved in the E3/EU+3 format (also called P5+1 for consisting of five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany – and the HR/VP). While it was later the bilateral negotiations between the US and Iran that ensured a deal was reached, the European initiative was important to the successful passage of the *Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action*.

With its intergovernmental nature, the initiative of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the UK corresponds closely to the predictions of distributive-bargaining rational institutionalism. The "E3" (the three largest EU MS) took leadership in extraordinary times: One central consideration for the "big three" had been their previous split with regards to the U.S.-American war in Iraq. They wanted to show European unity and to demonstrate that they, indeed, were capable of pursuing a joint European policy (Bergenäs 2010; Cronberg 2017). They thus clearly represent a self-selected leadership group, and relative power and capability was a clear selection criterion. They wanted to demonstrate European unity in a policy field in which their interests strongly converged, such as is nuclear non-proliferation (Adebahr 2017).

Significantly, they sought to demonstrate European unity without notifying the other MS first. The E3 expected the other MS to accept it and follow suit: The French foreign minister called the start of the negotiations an "important day for Europe" (Bergenäs 2010, 504). The other MS, caught by surprise by the trilateral visit to Tehran in early October, brought the issue to the front in the Council meeting on October 21st 2003 – a first indication that other MS would not simply acquiesce vis-à-vis the coalition of powerful MS, as distributive bargaining theory would predict. Nonetheless, the French representative clarified that while a European initiative, France, the UK, and Germany were not acting on behalf of the Union and that requirements of confidentiality and

urgency would not allow another approach – focusing on the functional benefits informal cooperation provides (Pouponneau 2013).

Ultimately, these arguments were insufficient to get a blank check from other MS. At the December 2003 Council meeting, other MS and Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands, in particular, questioned whether the E3 should speak in the name of the EU and demanded to be better informed about the negotiations (Adebahr 2017; Hill 2010). This open contestation, again, is much more in line with sociological predictions. The demand for transparency about the negotiations then represents the formulation of conditions for the acceptance of the leadership role of the E3.

The compromise that was reached then also represented a rearrangement of the leadership coalition – and an increase in transparency vis-à-vis the other MS – when the Council officially asked HR/VP Javier Solana to accompany the missions of the big MS (Pouponneau 2013). While Solana served as an important link of information to other MS, his original role was limited. As a French negotiator put it, the three MS coordinated among them and left the HR/VP "no margin of manoeuvre" as Solana was "happy to listen" (Pouponneau 2013, 129, authors' translation).

The E3 now officially negotiated on the EU's behalf, offering, for instance, the resumption of the EU-Iran Comprehensive Dialogue, which had been stalled in 2002 (Cronberg 2017). While the participation of the HR/VP may have been symbolical in the beginning, his role grew more relevant over time. Solana served the crucial role to inform the other MS about the progress of the negotiations, also providing legitimacy to the E3 initiative in this regard (Bergenäs 2010; Cronberg 2017). The fact that increased transparency significantly increased the legitimacy of the E3 coalition is strongly indicative of a sociological process, as the E3 still formulated policy without any intervention from other MS. Only at a later stage did Solana become the central interlocutor between Iran and the E3 and played an important role in the negotiations: Solana's successor, Catherine Ashton, was acknowledged by her US-American counterparts for keeping the negotiations alive in 2010 (Bergenäs 2010; Cronberg 2017).

The leadership of the E3 was put to the test when they wanted to flank their policy through sanctions, which required the unanimous support of all MS. Some MS were strongly opposed to sanctions in the beginning, and Austria vetoed a decision on sanctions on Iran in 2007 (Sauer 2019). Austria and other MS only agreed to support the comprehensive sanctions regime after Germany, Iran's biggest European trading partner, threw its full support behind it. While the losses of individual MS weigh equally heavy on their economy, Germany's willingness to lose out – given that it stood to lose most from the sanctions – motivated a general commitment among, and expectation to comply of, the other MS. Their adherence was thus organised through the demonstrated commitment and leadership of Germany that shaped the choices of the other MS in such a way that it would have been inappropriate for other MS to block the policy (Cronberg 2017).

Overall, while the inception of the negotiations with Iran was fully intergovernmental and in line with the projections of distributive-bargaining institutionalism, the response by other MS and their insistence on the involvement of the HR/VP strongly correlate with sociological theory. The E3 had created extraordinary circumstances through their trilateral initiative. Through the inclusion of the HR/VP, they had a guaranteed channel of information relay. In this way, the leadership of France, Germany and the UK was more legitimate vis-à-vis the other MS. While other MS seem aware that the large MS have further-going prerogatives, they nonetheless expect to be involved and informed about negotiations and their support for the informal coalition is organised through the demonstration of good and committed leadership.

Ukraine crisis

The Ukraine crisis erupted over the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which then-President Yanukovych cancelled last minute. In its first response to the Maidan demonstrations, the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier chose the format of the "Weimar triangle", itself an informal coalition consisting of France, Germany, and Poland. Not officially an emissary of, but informally relaying their activity back to their colleagues sitting in Brussels, they facilitated an agreement reached between government and opposition, which they signed "for the European Union" (Middelaar 2019, 79).

This first initiative broke down quickly after Russia invaded Crimea in February 2014. It was taken up again by France and Germany at the anniversary of the Allied landing in Normandy, bringing about the "Normandy Format" between France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, which would become the central contact group for the Ukraine crisis. The Normandy Format negotiated the Minsk agreements, which form the central tenet of EU policy towards resolving the crisis in Ukraine. The format has been recognised by the other MS through the EU sanctions regime, which directly relates the lifting of sanctions to the successful implementation of the Minsk agreements. These negotiations are currently ongoing as the conflict in Eastern Ukraine continues.

The relationship with Russia is particularly delicate for EU foreign policy, as MS' positions have historically diverged significantly (Härtel 2019). As a result of this, some MS stand to lose a lot more than other MS (in economic and political terms) from good or bad relations with Russia. In so far, the presence of Poland in the first trilateral initiative is significant. Poland has been one of the MS most critical of Russia, one of the "New Cold Warriors" (Vitkus 2015, 9). As such, their presence assuaged concerns by MS more critical of the Russian Federation and gave legitimacy to the German initiative. This is also a clear indication that the leadership coalition did not operate out of power-based ability but out of concerns for the appropriateness of their actions and the balance of positions among MS (Fix 2010; Seibel 2015; Vitkus 2015).

Some MS nonetheless complained about "too little Europe" in the Weimar triangle initiative, indicating that any leadership coalition would face similar scrutiny by other

MS (Middelaar 2019, 79). The Franco-German leadership through the Normandy Format, however, was then fully supported by the Council from the very beginning (Härtel 2019). Distributive bargaining institutionalism would expect to be the UK, the only other MS on par with France and Germany, to be present within the coalition. However, France's and Germany's position vis-à-vis Russia is significantly more to the centre of the range of MS' Russia policies. This gave them an advantageous position to mediate between more hawkish and dovish MS, ensuring that their leadership would not be contested as to be too one-sided (Helwig 2019, Vitkus 2015). Taken together with the presence of Poland at the first "Weimar Triangle" initiative, this strongly suggests social processes at play in the formation of the informal leadership coalition.

Again, the European institutions were more proactive in trying to gain a seat at the table. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Crimea, Council President Van Rompuy tried to open a channel to negotiate directly with Putin. This was met with strict opposition by the Polish representatives to the EU, who were worried Van Rompuy could potentially make concessions behind their back, and Van Rompuy had to cancel the trip last minute (Middelaar 2019) – even though channelling talks with Moscow through the EU would have formally enhanced Polish influence over policymaking. Leadership by an informal coalition was preferred by non-involved MS – a behaviour hard to reconcile with distributive-bargaining institutionalism, where Poland would reluctantly accept leadership by the more powerful MS but would not have an active preference for it over common action.

For Franco-German leadership to be effective, they also needed to demonstrate commitment. The establishment of sanctions proved a difficult venture, as some MS stood to lose significantly more than other MS. Many MS, for instance, Austria and Italy, were reluctant to impose sanctions. Only after Germany showed readiness to (also) lose economically in favour of a strong political response, other MS perceived German leadership on the issue as legitimate (Fix 2018). Franco-German leadership was further solidified after France cancelled the 1.2 billion EUR contract for Mistral warships with Russia – both Germany and France thus demonstrated the importance of their policy through the foregoing of economic gains for the sake of a common European response (Vitkus 2015).

Furthermore, they also actively linked their efforts back to other MS and the EU – another indication that informal leadership groups do not operate in the black box of "extraordinary circumstances", as distributive-bargaining theory would suggest, but that processes of legitimation of leadership are taking place. The first instance of this is the Weimar triangle negotiations in Kyiv, during which they had open channels with their colleagues in Brussels. Exemplary of this is also the involvement of Italian, British and EU officials in a preparatory meeting for the Normandy Format in October 2014 (Bundesregierung 2014); or their direct reporting of the February 2015 Normandy format results to the European Council even before talking to the press (Middelaar 2019).

As a result, France and Germany were able to rally the support of the other MS. Even those States most reluctant to apply sanctions would not reject Franco-German

leadership as they feared isolation in EU policymaking (Härtel 2019). Similarly, other relatively pro-Russian MS, such as Hungary or Slovakia, limited their criticism and ultimately supported both the Normandy Format and Franco-German leadership in sanctions policy (Vitkus 2015).

Germany and France self-selected their leadership group, but they were able to exercise EU leadership because they showed commitment and functioned as a broker between more hawkish and dovish MS. While other MS had strong policy preferences themselves, Franco-German leadership was perceived as legitimate because they also bore a significant share of the costs of severing economic ties with Russia. Both during the group formation and in its work – through information-sharing with and mediating between MS – the informal coalition fulfilled a socially constituted leadership role.

Conclusion

Informal coalitions are a constant feature of both CFSP processes as well as of European foreign policy more generally. When these coalitions go beyond the formal CFSP procedures and assume informal leadership over EU foreign policy, other MS are quick to react to intergovernmental initiatives and demand "more Europe". Nonetheless, the leadership coalitions remain active not "at the disposal of the Council" but at their own direction in both investigated cases. There are, however, clearly observable communicative processes in which the leading MS justify and legitimise their leadership with regards to the other MS. Even in the Iran negotiations, which had started as a fully intergovernmental enterprise, the other MS managed to get a seat at the table through the HR/VP, and remained informed about and included in the negotiation process.

While the self-selection of the leadership group can be explained by the relative distribution of power in the case of the EU-Iran negotiations, the selection process at play in response to the Ukraine crisis is more in line with sociological predictions, where MS' relative positions also proved important in determining the composition of the coalition. This may also be indicative of a change over time towards a more social roles-based CFSP as the result of repeated interaction and socialisation. However, more research, ideally with participant interviews, would be required to validate this thesis.

After the original inception of the group, the leadership coalition actively works to demonstrate good leadership and organise support from the other MS – through regular exchange of information, demonstration of commitment, and mediation between the other MS, much in line with the predictions of sociological institutionalism. In both cases, the leadership coalitions were ultimately successful in mobilising other MS for their policy, evidenced by the unanimous passing of EU sanctions against Iran and Russia, respectively.

To successfully pass sanctions, the leadership coalitions demonstrated their commitment to incur large economic losses themselves, which created a sense of responsibility among the other MS to follow their lead. It becomes clear that one cannot

fully disregard the element of relative power in the formation of informal leadership groups, but that a sociological account of the intra-EU dynamics has more explanatory value in these cases – leadership is exercised mainly through sociological processes of legitimation of policy that are, however, partially dependent on material power-based factors.

This supports a more supranational reading of the EU's CFSP but also invites further research into the relationship between material and ideational factors inside and outside Council meetings. Neither a fully intergovernmental approach nor a wholly supranational social theory of CFSP can explain MS behaviour in these cases. Generally, more attention should be paid to the bilateral and multilateral relations between MS rather than to the formal institutions and processes involved in CFSP decision-making alone. More research is required to properly understand how and if the phenomenon of leadership groups provides an effective vehicle for the formulation and implementation of EU foreign policy.

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Das Vertrauen junger Tunesier*innen in politische Partizipationsräume: Warum die EU-Demokratieförderung ihren Blickwinkel ändern muss

Abstract

Die Europäische Union begleitet die politische Transition der Tunesischen Republik durch Demokratieförderprogramme und fokussiert sich auf den Aufbau formaler politischer Institutionen sowie die Förderung zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure. Zugleich zeigen sich Vertrauenslücken zwischen diesen formalen Partizipationsräumen und tunesischen Jugendlichen, die zu den Hauptakteuren der Revolution von 2011 zählen. In dieser Arbeit wird das Vertrauen junger tunesischer Bürger*innen in demokratische Partizipationsinstrumente untersucht, die von EU-Demokratisierungsprogrammen gefördert werden. Es wird gezeigt, dass junge tunesische Bürger*innen aufgrund verschiedener Vertrauenslücken informelle Räume politischen Ausdrucks geschaffen haben, die in der EU-Außenpolitik bisher kaum Berücksichtigung fanden.

Keywords: EU-Außenpolitik; Demokratieförderung; Tunesien; politische Partizipation; Vertrauen

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Einleitung

Wohin bewegt sich Tunesien nach der Revolution von 2011? Dies ist eine zentrale Frage internationaler Diskurse, die sich mit der Zukunft des nordafrikanischen Staates auseinandersetzen – auch innerhalb der Europäischen Union und ihrer Außenpolitik (vgl. u.a. Mouhib, 2014; Europäische Kommission, 2021). Der Diskurs über die Zukunft des Landes seit 2011 bewegt sich laut Keskes und Martin (2018) zwischen zwei Polen: Einerseits wird das Land als „success story" (Keskes und Martin, 2018, S. 1; vgl. auch Culbertson, 2016) bezeichnet, das mitunter als „Leuchtturm der Hoffnung" (Ratka, 2017, S. 54) in der Region gilt, andererseits wird regelmäßig darauf hingewiesen, dass autokratische Rückschläge in Tunesien nicht nur denkbar, sondern Realität sind (vgl. Torelli, 2016).

Die Europäische Union leistet im Rahmen ihrer Nachbarschaftspolitik sowie ihrer Entwicklungszusammenarbeit für verschiedene Staaten Unterstützung im Bereich der Demokratisierung. Oft angeknüpft an ökonomische Kooperationen, ist seit den 1990er-Jahren eine Politisierung ihrer Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen feststellbar, um Werte wie Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit sowie freie Wahlen als universelle demokratische Werte zu fördern (vgl. Dandashly, 2017, S. 64). Seit dem *EU-Tunisia Association Agreement* von 1995 zeigt sich die Europäische Union besonders an einer Partnerschaft mit Tunesien interessiert (vgl. Europäische Kommission, 2021). Vor allem aber seit den Protesten von 2010 und 2011, die mitunter als „Arabischer Frühling" bezeichnet werden und das autoritäre, polizeistaatliche Regime Ben Alis (1989-2011) ablösten, beteiligen sich verschiedene EU-Akteure an der äußeren Förderung von Demokratie in der Tunesischen Republik. Unter anderem ist das EU-Parlament unter den Akteuren zu finden, welches sich als „particularly committed to promoting democracy" (Europäisches Parlament, 2021) ansieht. Auch die Europäische Kommission beteiligt sich an dem Vorhaben, insbesondere durch das *European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights* (EIDHR) sowie das *European Neighbourhood Instrument* (ENI) (vgl. European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019, S. 5). Daneben zählt der *European Development Fund* (EDF) zu den Hauptinstrumenten der EU-Demokratieförderung (vgl. ebd., S. 6).

Jugendliche in Tunesien gelten mitunter als „Hauptmotor der Ereignisse von 2010/2011" (Dihstelhoff, 2018a, S. 1) und haben während und nach 2011 eine Vielzahl an Forderungen an den Systemwandel formuliert, darunter Partizipation, politischen Pluralismus und die Garantie individueller Freiheiten (vgl. Ben Achour, 2016, S. 80). Zwar wurde formal betrachtet in Tunesien im Jahr 2014 mit der Verfassungsgebung ein demokratisches, semipräsidentielles System eingeführt (vgl. Rothers, 2018, S. 44), allerdings muss die politische Wirklichkeit des eingeführten Systems betrachtet werden. Das Verhältnis von jungen Menschen zum neuen System ist von Misstrauen geprägt, zeigen Studien zur Wahlbeteiligung und zu politischem Engagement (vgl. u.a. Ben Haj Omar, 2018; Dihstelhoff, 2018a). Insbesondere politische Parteien genießen wenig Vertrauen von Jugendlichen und tragen zu deren Politikverdrossenheit bei (vgl. Dihstelhoff, 2018a, S. 8). Roberts, Kovacheva und Kabaivanov (2017, S. 12) zeigen, dass die Enttäuschung über das postrevolutionäre System unter jungen Menschen tief ist

und verschiedene Wege der Abkehr davon gesucht werden. Zehn Jahre nach den Protestbewegungen von 2011 und sieben Jahre nach der Verabschiedung der Verfassung ist fraglich, wie junge tunesische Bürger*innen mit den neueingeführten und von der EU-gestützten Instrumenten und Möglichkeiten demokratischer Partizipation umgehen und welche politische Wirklichkeit sich für sie ergibt.

Mit Blick auf diese nationalen Entwicklungen betrachtet dieser Artikel den offenen Transitionsprozess Tunesiens und wird sich dabei auf das Vertrauen junger tunesischer Bürger*innen in demokratische Partizipationsinstrumente beziehen, die von der Europäischen Union im Rahmen ihrer Demokratisierungsprogramme vorangebracht werden. Dieser Artikel steht damit unter der Fragestellung: Inwiefern vertrauen junge tunesische Bürger*innen den politischen Partizipationsmöglichkeiten, die im Rahmen der EU-Demokratisierungsprogramme innerhalb der Tunesischen Republik entstanden sind, und woraus resultieren Spannungen in diesem Vertrauensverhältnis? Gemäß internationalen Definitionen von Jugend wird die Altersspanne von 18 bis 35 Jahren berücksichtigt (vgl. u.a. OHCHR, 2015). Dennoch sollen diese Grenzen lediglich als Richtlinie dienen und auch Problematiken beachtet werden, die Menschen außerhalb dieser Altersspanne betreffen. Das diesem Artikel zugrunde liegende Hauptargument ist, dass sich junge tunesische Bürger*innen in verschiedenen Formen institutionalisierten politischen Engagements ausprobieren, sie sich aber durch verschiedene Vertrauenslücken vom System entfernt und eigene informelle Räume politischen Ausdrucks geschaffen haben, die in der EU-Außenpolitik bisher nur begrenzt Berücksichtigung finden.

In methodischer Hinsicht wurde für diese Arbeit ein qualitativer Ansatz gewählt. Es handelt sich um eine Einzelfallstudie Tunesiens, die einen deskriptiv-explorativen Ansatz verfolgt. Zur Unterstützung der Literaturrecherche wurde ein ethnographischer Ansatz hinzugefügt und eine eigene empirische Erhebung vorgenommen. Insgesamt wurden vier Interviews mit semi-direktiven Leitfäden auf Englisch und Französisch geführt, die in dieser Arbeit anonymisiert dargestellt werden. Dabei wurde auf eine Gender-Balance geachtet und zwei weibliche und zwei männliche Personen interviewt. Ebenso sollten neben zwei jugendlichen Aktivist*innen im Alter von 21 (Aktivistin 1) und 27 Jahren (Aktivist 2)[1] auch zwei Expert*innen im Bereich von sozialen Bewegungen (Expertin 1) und religiöser Radikalisierung (Experte 2) zu Wort kommen, um einen externen Blick auf die Aussagen der jungen Menschen zu erhalten. Zudem soll an dieser Stelle darauf hingewiesen werden, dass die soziale Rolle des*r Forschenden

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[1] Die beiden interviewten Jugendlichen (Aktivistin 1; Aktivist 2) wurden im Rahmen eines Feldforschungsaufenthalts in der Hauptstadt Tunis ausgewählt. Sie erlauben eine small-N-Einsicht in die Anliegen junger tunesischer Bürger*innen. Im Gegensatz zu Aktivistin 1, die sich aufgrund ihres Alters erst nach der Revolution von 2011 politisiert hat, gab Aktivist 2 an, aktiv an den Protesten von 2010/2011 teilgenommen zu haben. Während sich Aktivistin 1 aktiv in verschiedenen Vereinen politisch engagiert, weist Aktivist 2 darauf hin, dass er seine politischen Tätigkeiten aufgrund seiner Enttäuschung vom postrevolutionären institutionellen System reduziert hat. Damit liegen zwei verschiedene soziale Profile vor, die verschiedene Einsichten ermöglichen. Weitere Informationen zu den sozio-ökonomischen Merkmalen der beiden Jugendlichen sind aufgrund ihrer gewünschten Anonymität nicht möglich. Es soll lediglich darauf verwiesen werden, dass die angestrebte Repräsentativität ihrer Aussagen durch die geringe Zahl an Interviews sowie einen eventuellen Effekt „sozialer Erwünschtheit" (Blatter, Langer und Wagemann 2018, S. 66) eingeschränkt sein könnte, auch wenn ihre Aussagen durch die zweier Expert*innen ergänzt wurden.

im internationalen und postkolonialen Kontext der Recherche aufgeladen sein kann (vgl. Pascucci, 2018).

Demokratisierungsvorhaben der Europäischen Union in Tunesien

Spätestens seit Ende des Kalten Krieges (1947-1989) ist der Begriff „Demokratisierung" nicht mehr aus der Disziplin der internationalen Politik wegzudenken. Dabei finden verschiedene Demokratiemodelle Anwendung, die von den Demokratiefördernden als Zielrichtung, als Teleologie politischer Entwicklungen angesehen werden (vgl. u.a. Petersen, 2009). Historisch betrachtet werden verschiedene „waves of democratisation" (Huntington, 1993) unterschieden, die als „group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes" (ebd., S. 15) bezeichnet werden können. Spätestens seit den Ereignissen des „Arabischen Frühlings" 2011 sind es einige Staaten der MENA-Region, die zum Objekt der Demokratieforschung wurden (vgl. Abushouk, 2016).

Zentrale Demokratiebegriffe, die in diesem Artikel Anwendung finden, ergeben sich aus den zwei Ebenen, die von Bridoux und Kurki (2014) ebenso wie von Cooper und Farooq (2016) aufgespannt werden. Die erste Ebene kann als *electoral democracy"* (Bridoux und Kurki, 2014, S. 2, kursiv im Original) bezeichnet werden und fokussiert sich auf freie und faire Wahlen (vgl. ebd.), die mit einem universellen Wahlrecht und Presse-, Meinungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit einhergehen (vgl. auch Cooper und Farooq, 2016, S. 1526) und bei denen durch den Wahlprozess Repräsentant*innen in eine oder mehrere Kammern entsandt werden (vgl. Dahl, 1971). Die zweite Ebene hingegen wird von Bridoux und Kurki (2014) als *liberal democracy"* (2, kursiv im Original) benannt und beinhaltet fundamentale individuelle Freiheiten und Abwehrrechte, die in einer Verfassung garantiert sind (vgl. ebd.; vgl. auch Cooper und Farooq, 2016, S. 1526). Zugleich wird an diesen beiden Konzepten kritisiert, sie stellten lediglich eine „low intensity democracy" (vgl. Gills, Rocamera und Wilson 1993) dar und würden partizipativere Formen von Demokratie abwehren.

Es sind die Proteste und Umstürze des „Arabischen Frühlings" von 2011, die eine neue Debatte über die Unbestimmtheit der Entwicklungsrichtung der MENA-Staaten auslöste (vgl. Valbjørn, 2012). Dennoch wurde dieser Prozess zeitnah von an der Demokratisierung der Region interessierten europäischen und nordamerikanischen Akteuren begleitet (vgl. Hinnebusch, 2015). Diese externe Demokratieförderung in der MENA-Region ist zunächst verknüpft mit dem Narrativ des demokratischen Friedens (vgl. Schimmelfennig, 2013, S. 218), das sich nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges (1939-1945) herausgebildet hat und die Annahme abbildete, eine konsolidierte Demokratie würde keinen Krieg betreiben (vgl. ebd., S. 219). Damit wurde Demokratie als ein „public good" (Cooper und Farooq, 2016, S. 1524) angesehen, das an Staaten verteilt werden kann.

Demokratisierungsversuche der Europäischen Union in der MENA-Region gelten als Maßnahme, im Rahmen ihrer Nachbarschaftspolitik Stabilität in angrenzenden

Regionen zu schaffen (vgl. Burlafinger, 2018; Erdmann und Kneuer, 2014; Demesmay, Främke und Sold, 2012; Bridoux und Kurki 2014, S. 27). Zur Stärkung der Beziehungen zwischen der EU und ihren Nachbarstaaten stehen zwei Komponenten im Vordergrund: die Förderung demokratischer Governance sowie die Herstellung politischer Stabilität (vgl. Börzel und van Hüllen, 2014), aus Gründen wie wirtschaftlicher Zusammenarbeit, Energiekooperation oder zur Lösung politischer Konflikte (vgl. Schäfer 2009, S. 66). Jedoch stehen gerade diese beiden Elemente in einem direkten Konflikt miteinander, da eine Transition bzw. Aufweichung eines (semi-)autoritären Regimes durch Demokratisierung zu politischer Instabilität und zur Herausbildung unvorhergesehener Akteure führen kann (vgl. ebd.). Von verschiedenen Autor*innen wird daher bemängelt, Sicherheitspolitik sowie Migrationskontrolle und damit die Suche nach geopolitischer Stabilität dominierten die Intention der Demokratisierungsvorhaben, und nicht die tatsächliche Herausbildung eines pluralisierten demokratischen Systems (vgl. Dandashly, 2017).

Für die Europäische Union hat der Mittelmeerraum eine zentrale Bedeutung, nicht nur politisch, sondern auch zum wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Austausch (vgl. Schäfer 2009, S. 66). In diesem Sinne handelt es sich bei der Mittelmeerunion zudem um ein regionales Forum, das die EU zur Demokratieförderung in Tunesien nutzt. Das im Jahr 2008 initiierte Kooperationsprojekt zwischen europäischen Staaten und Staaten der MENA-Region gilt als Ergebnis der im Jahr 1995 begonnenen Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft (EMP) und wird zu weiten Teilen durch Instrumente wie die Europäische Investitionsbank, die Europäische Kommission sowie das *European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument* (ENPI) finanziert (vgl. u.a. Zorob, 2008).

Seit 2011 hat die EU insgesamt eine Summe von fast drei Milliarden Euro in die Unterstützung tunesischer Demokratisierung investiert (vgl. Europäische Kommission, 2021). Zwischen 2017 und 2020 lag der Fokus dabei vor allem auf der Förderung von *Good Governance* und Rechtsstaatlichkeit, ökonomischem Wachstum sowie sozialer Kohäsion (vgl. ebd.).   Auf institutioneller Ebene sollen Dialogformate wie das vom EU-Parlament gestützte Programm *Young Political Leaders* politischen Nachwuchs und demokratischer Bildung fördern sowie der *Jean Monnet Dialogue* externe Anstöße für Veränderungen liefern (vgl. Europäisches Parlament, 2020, S. 9). Zudem bringt sich das EU-Parlament unter anderem in Wahlbeobachtung in Tunesien ein (vgl. Europäisches Parlament, 2021). Auch Dialoge zwischen der tunesischen Regierung und zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren sollen gefördert werden (vgl. Europäische Kommission, 2021).

Nach dem „more for more"-Prinzip – sprich einem Prinzip der Konditionalität – wurden der Tunesischen Republik Hilfsleistungen gezahlt, wenn bestimmte institutionelle Reformen vorangetrieben wurden, darunter die Schaffung von politischen Parteien, einem unabhängigen Justizsystem, einer transparenten Verwaltung oder der Umsetzung von Menschenrechtsstandards (vgl. Johansson-Nogués und Rivera Escartin, 2020, S. 1382; Europäisches Parlament, 2016, S. 29). Ein weiteres Muster, das sich in den Demokratisierungsansätzen in der MENA-Region herausgebildet hat, ist das

der Stärkung der Regionen und der Dezentralisierung (vgl. Tosun/Yilmaz, 2010), um geografische Marginalisierung zu verringern.

In Demokratisierungsprozessen und der Demokratieförderung wird die Einbeziehung von Bürger*innen in Form von Zivilgesellschaft von der EU als ein Mittel zur Konsolidierung junger Demokratien angesehen (vgl. Berman, 1997; Bridoux/Kurki, 2014). In Tunesien engagiert sich die EU in diesem Sinne durch die *Civil Society Facility* sowie das *European Endowment for Democracy*. Das erste Instrument wird von der Europäischen Kommission finanziert und setzt vor allem auf Fortbildungen und Seminare für zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen (vgl. EU Neighbours, 2021). Das *European Endowment for Democracy* ergänzt diese Arbeit, setzt allerdings auch auf aktivistische Gruppierungen sowie die Förderung von Pressefreiheit (vgl. European Endowment for Democracy, 2020, S. 29). Einzelne Sektoren hingegen werden durch *Erasmus+* oder das Rechercheprogramm *Horizon 2020* unterstützt (vgl. Europäische Kommission, 2021).

An der äußeren Förderung von Demokratie in der MENA-Region beteiligen sich ergänzend einzelne Staaten oder internationale Organisationen wie die Vereinten Nationen (vgl. Bridoux und Kurki 2014, S. 26f.). Dabei geschieht die Förderung auch über staatlich geförderte Stiftungen sowie nationale und internationale Nichtregierungsorganisationen (vgl. ebd., S. 30), aber auch Privatunternehmen, Think Tanks, Bildungseinrichtungen und Grassroot-Organisationen können als Durchführ- und Empfangendenorganisationen gelten (vgl. ebd., S. 31), wodurch „democracy promotion constitutes a global whole in which key donors, states, development agencies and NGOs and INGOs are tightly linked to each other" (ebd., S. 30).

Damit liegen verschiedene Achsen der Demokratieförderung vor, die die Europäische Union mittels unterschiedlicher Akteure in Tunesien betreibt, um im Einklang mit den selbstgesetzten Zielen der Förderung von Stabilität und politischer Teilhabe zu stehen. Doch wie werden die EU-geförderten Vorhaben von tunesischen Bürger*innen, insbesondere von jungen Menschen, lokal aufgenommen und wie gehen sie mit den Partizipationsforen um, die von der EU gestützt werden? Dazu werden in den folgenden Kapiteln institutionelle politische Partizipation, zivilgesellschaftliche Räume sowie informelle Ausdrucksformen näher betrachtet und Rückschlüsse auf das Verhältnis zwischen der EU und der tunesischen Gesellschaft herausgearbeitet.

Das Vertrauen in institutionelle politische Partizipationsformen

Als eine der ersten Errungenschaften der tunesischen Revolution wurde eine Pluralisierung politischer Akteure eingeleitet. Zu den dadurch entstandenen Partizipationsräumen innerhalb der „*electoral democracy*" (Bridoux und Kurki, 2014, S. 2, kursiv im Original) zählen das aktive und passive Wahlrecht, das politischen Parteien eine zentrale Rolle zukommen lässt, die durch eine Pluralisierung des tunesischen Parteiensystems in Folge der Revolution von 2011 gestärkt wurde (vgl.

Szmolka, 2017, S. 354). Die Europäische Union sieht die Teilhabe an politischen Institutionen sowie an formalen Wahlprozessen als entscheidend für die Transition Tunesiens an und begleitet daher deren Umstrukturierung (vgl. Europäische Kommission, 2021; Johansson-Nogués und Rivera Escartin, 2020, S. 1378). Sie fokussiert damit die oben erläuterte „electoral democracy", bei der sich Demokratie aus formalen Wahl- und Repräsentationsprozessen ergibt.

Parteien wird eine entscheidende Rolle für die demokratische Transition des Landes zugesprochen (vgl. Yerkes und Yahmed, 2019, S. 6; Yardımcı-Geyikçi und Tür, 2018, S. 2). Yerkes und Yahmed (2019) unterscheiden acht bedeutende politische Parteien in Tunesien, darunter die zwei an der Regierungskoalition von September 2020 bis Juli 2021 beteiligten Parteien *Ennahdha* und *Tahya Tounes* sowie *Nidaa Tounes* (vgl. Yerkes und Yahmed, 2019, S. 7f.). Trotz dieser essenziellen Funktion der Parteien für die Konsolidierung des demokratischen Systems haben junge Menschen nur ein geringes Vertrauen in diese. Wie Albert und Hegasy (2017) zeigen, ist das Interesse junger tunesischer Bürger*innen an nationaler Politik gering. Nur zehn Prozent der für die Studie interviewten Menschen zwischen 16 und 30 Jahren seien an Politik „interessiert" oder „sehr interessiert", während sich 67 % „nicht interessieren" (vgl. Albert und Hegasy, 2017, S. 290), was sich vom Durchschnittswert der MENA-Region (57 % „nicht interessiert") abhebt. In diesem Sinne informieren sich auch lediglich 21 % der tunesischen Jugendlichen aktiv über Politik (vgl. ebd., S. 292). Dies deckt sich auch mit den Resultaten anderer Studien über das politische Interesse junger Menschen (vgl. u.a. Ben Haj Omar, 2018; Dihstelhoff, 2018a).

Das Interesse junger tunesischer Bürger*innen an Wahlen und politischen Parteien

Wie sich in den für diesen Artikel geführten Interviews ergeben hat (vgl. Aktivist 2, 2019; Experte 2, 2019), war das Interesse an der politischen Entwicklung des Landes während und nach 2011 durchaus höher, als es heute der Fall ist, da Hoffnung auf eine tatsächliche Besserung der Situation des Landes bestand (vgl. auch Silveira, 2015, S. 19; Ben Haj Omar, 2018). Zudem stellten die Umstürze von 2011 für viele junge Menschen ein Ereignis der Politisierung dar, wie es unter anderem bei der interviewten Aktivistin 1 (2019) der Fall war (vgl. hierzu auch Albert und Hegasy, 2017, S. 303). Die Performanz der Arbeit der Politiker*innen und Parteien in der postrevolutionären Phase war jedoch für viele junge Bürger*innen nicht zufriedenstellend (vgl. Ben Haj Omar, 2018), was sich darin widerspiegelt, dass nur rund 20 % der tunesischen Jugendlichen Vertrauen in politische Parteien haben (vgl. Albert und Hegasy, 2017, S. 301). In anderen Studien ist der Wert mit 3 % noch geringer (vgl. Dihstelhoff, 2018a, S. 8). Der interviewte Aktivist 2 (2019) beschreibt, viele Bürger*innen hätten der islamistischen *Ennahdha*-Partei mehrere Chancen gegeben, die sie allerdings nicht genutzt hätten, um konkrete Veränderungen im Land hervorzurufen.

Damit wird das Verhalten politischer Parteien mitunter als verspielte Chance angesehen. Dies beweist auch die abnehmende Wahlbeteiligung im Land. Während sich die ersten Wahlen nach der Verfassungsgebung, respektive die ersten Legislativwahlen sowie die Präsidentschaftswahl im Jahr 2014, noch durch eine Wahlbeteiligung zwischen 60 % und 70 % aller eingetragenen Wähler*innen auszeichneten (vgl. Szmolka, 2017, S. 354), sank die Beteiligung während der ersten Kommunalwahlen im Mai 2018 auf rund 33,7 % ab (vgl. Gallien und Werenfels, 2019, S. 7). Die Verwaltungsebene spielt hierbei eine nicht zu vernachlässigende Rolle. Allgemein ist das Interesse der jungen Bevölkerung an nationalen politischen Entwicklungen allerdings zwischen 2011 und 2018 wie oben gezeigt gesunken. Diese Studienergebnisse zeigen, dass das Interesse junger Menschen an nationaler Politik tendenziell über die vergangenen Jahre abgenommen hat und dieses Phänomen in direkter Verbindung mit nationalen politischen Vorgängen und Enttäuschungen steht.

Zunächst scheinen Parteien die Probleme und Anliegen der Bürger*innen, insbesondere der jungen Menschen, nur unzureichend zu kanalisieren und zu repräsentieren. Nach außen hin sind es nicht Lösungen politischer Probleme, sondern interne Zerwürfnisse und das Streben nach Macht, mit denen sich Politiker*innen zu beschäftigen scheinen, wie auch Aktivist 2 (2019) in einem Interview darstellt. Trotz der Pluralisierung der politischen Parteien nach 2011 und kompetitiver Wahlen (vgl. Szmolka, 2017, S. 353f.) stellen Yerkes und Yahmed (2019, S. 4) fest, dass keine Trennschärfe zwischen den Parteien existiert und ihnen ein eindeutiges Programm sowie ein Profil fehlt, um sich von anderen Parteien abzugrenzen. Ein Grund für diese mangelnde Unterscheidbarkeit der Parteien liegt in der breiten Koalition aus verschiedenen Parteien – darunter die islamistische *Ennahdha* sowie die 2019 von Youssef Chahed (Premierminister von 2016 bis 2020) von *Nidaa Tounes* abgespaltene Partei *Tahya Tounes* (vgl. Yerkes und Yahmed 2019, S. 7) –, die den parteiunabhängigen Premierminister Hichem Mechichi (im Amt von September 2020 bis Juli 2021)[2] stützen und ein Konsensmodell innerhalb des Parlaments anstreben (vgl. ebd., S. 4; Yardımcı-Geyikçi und Tür 2018, S. 6). Dies spiegelt sich auch in den häufigen Neuformierungen und Blockwechseln vieler Abgeordneter im Parlament wider, was Yerkes und Yahmed (2019, S. 9) als „Party tourism" bezeichnen.

Diese mangelnde inhaltliche Ausrichtung politischer Parteien in Tunesien hat auch Auswirkungen auf die Policies, die von Parteien entwickelt werden. Hinter den internen Machtkämpfen in Parteien und der daraus resultierenden fehlenden Bereitstellung eines geeigneten politischen Programms stehen verschiedene Forderungen der Aufstände von 2010/2011 zurück (vgl. Yardımcı-Geyikçi und Tür, 2018, S. 8; Yerkes und Yahmed, 2019, S. 4), darunter insbesondere eine Forderung, die junge Menschen betrifft: Die sozio-ökonomische Situation des Landes leidet unter dem Mangel an Reformen und Vorschlägen von Seiten der Regierung (vgl. Weilandt, 2018, S. 211; Vatthauer und Weipert-Fenner, 2017, S. 2). Tatsächlich bestehen ökonomische Anliegen, die unter den Hauptforderungen der Revolution waren (vgl. Zemni, 2015, S.

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[2] Zum Zeitpunkt der Redaktion dieses Artikels wurde Mechichi in der Funktion des Premierministers abgesetzt und sein Amt vom Präsidenten Kais Saied übernommen, der am 25.7.2021 auch die Funktion des Parlaments für zunächst 30 Tage einfror.

54f.), in der postrevolutionären Phase fort. So stieg die Arbeitslosigkeit zwischen 2010 und 2018 von 23 % auf 30 % an, insbesondere unter jungen Menschen und Universitätsabsolvent*innen (vgl. Yerkes und Yahmed, 2019, S. 4), und die wirtschaftliche Leistung des Landes sank (vgl. Yardımcı-Geyikçi und Tür, 2018, S. 6). Auf Probleme wie regionale Disparitäten ökonomischer und politischer Art und der damit einhergehenden Stärkung der Kommunen durch ordnungsgemäß durchgeführte Kommunalwahlen scheinen Politiker*innen auf nationaler Ebene in den Augen vieler Bürger*innen ebenfalls kaum einzugehen (vgl. Torelli, 2016, S. 1; Volpi, Merone und Loschi, 2016, S. 17) bzw. kein ausgearbeitetes, effektiv wirkendes Programm zu besitzen (vgl. Yerkes und Yahmed, 2019, S. 6). Dies hängt auch damit zusammen, dass sich die politischen Parteien und ihre Repräsentant*innen in der Hauptstadt Tunis konzentrieren (vgl. ebd., S. 8).

Neben ihrem aktiven Wahlrecht und der Möglichkeit, Parteien von außen zu beurteilen, verfügen junge Menschen auch über die Möglichkeit, sich aktiv in Parteien zu engagieren und von ihrem passiven Wahlrecht Gebrauch zu machen. Allerdings ergibt sich hierzu zunächst der Aspekt einer für junge Bürger*innen wenig ansprechenden Atmosphäre, einer mangelhaften Tonalität (vgl. Siméant, 2014, S. 228) innerhalb von Parteien, auch wenn einige Parteien versuchen, durch effektiven Gebrauch von sozialen Medien für junge Menschen zugänglicher zu sein (vgl. Yerkes und Yahmed, 2019, S. 15). Viele junge Menschen beklagen, sie würden dort mit ihren Forderungen nicht ernstgenommen und ihre Vorschläge von älteren Mitgliedern belächelt oder gar ignoriert (vgl. Aktivistin 1, 2019; Aktivist 2, 2019; Experte 2, 2019). Auch die interne Strukturierung von Parteien scheint auf junge Menschen wenig attraktiv zu wirken. Die interviewte Expertin 1 (2019) beschreibt, junge Leute wollten sich nicht in Strukturen wiederfinden, die durch Macht und Hierarchie ausgezeichnet sind. Tatsächlich gelten viele tunesische Parteien als besonders personenzentriert und hierarchisch (vgl. Yardımcı-Geyikçi und Tür, 2018, S. 10; Yerkes und Yahmed, 2019, S. 9). Dies hemmt den Status von tunesischen Parteien, als Instanzen politischer Sozialisation (vgl. Franklin, 1984) zu gelten, die Jugendliche für politische Aktivitäten mobilisieren und langfristig an Strukturen binden.

All diese Faktoren tragen dazu bei, dass sich Yardımcı-Geyikçi und Tür (2018) auf Pridhams (2016) Theorie der Verwurzelung von Parteien in einer Gesellschaft stützen und für das Fallbeispiel Tunesien feststellen, „[that] most parties [...] are organizationally underdeveloped and have little or no roots in society" (Yardımcı-Geyikçi und Tür, 2018, S. 9). Parteien als zentrale Akteure einer von der EU-gestützten „electoral democracy" tragen also zu einer Vertrauenskrise mit jungen tunesischen Bürger*innen bei, die auch zu einzelnen Politiker*innen ein angespanntes Vertrauensverhältnis entwickeln.

Mangelndes Vertrauen in politisches Personal?

Es sind nicht nur politische Parteien als Gesamtheit, die das Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen dem institutionellen Rahmen und den jungen Menschen prägen, sondern

auch das politische Personal, das mittels Parteien Politik betreibt. Allgemein ist festzustellen, dass die politischen Repräsentant*innen in den Augen vieler Bürger*innen über eine angefochtene politische Legitimation verfügen (vgl. Torelli, 2016, S. 1). Um eine Erklärung für dieses Legitimationsdefizit zu finden, wurden drei verschiedene Ansätze identifiziert.

Ein erster Erklärungsansatz für mangelndes Vertrauen zwischen Politiker*innen und jungen Bürger*innen liegt in personellen Kontinuitäten zwischen dem *Ancien Régime* und dem postrevolutionären System. Junge Menschen vermuten hier einen Opportunismus einer politischen Elite, die sich zum Teil während der Herrschaft Ben Alis im Ausland aufgehalten hat oder aber in das Regierungssystem Ben Alis involviert war. So schildert Aktivist 2 (2019), dass man die gleichen Gesichter wie vor der Revolution wiederfände.

Des Weiteren liegt eine Ursache für die mangelnde Legitimität von Politiker*innen in deren öffentlichem Auftreten. Wie sich in mehreren Interviews gezeigt hat, scheint die öffentliche Kommunikation von Politiker*innen und deren Auftreten in Medien und in der Öffentlichkeit ein Faktor zu sein, der das Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen diesen und jungen Menschen schwächt. Aktivist 2 (2019) beschreibt, bis auf wenige Ausnahmen seien tunesische Politiker*innen nicht in der Lage, in den Medien zu sprechen. Das Auftreten von Politiker*innen scheint auch unter ihrer mangelnden Führungsqualität innerhalb von Parteien zu leiden (vgl. Aktivist 2, 2019; Experte 2, 2019).

Ein dritter Ansatz zur Untersuchung für die Distanzierung junger Menschen von parteipolitischem Engagement ist der Vorwurf, Politiker*innen seien – ebenso wie in der prärevolutionären Phase – in Korruption verwickelt. Tatsächlich wird das Fortbestehen von Korruption als Gefahr für die Konsolidierung und die Legitimität des auf der Verfassung von 2014 basierenden Systems angesehen (vgl. Ratka und Roux, 2016, S. 72; International Crisis Group, 2015, S. 11). In Statistiken spiegelt sich das gesamtgesellschaftliche Misstrauen gegenüber Politiker*innen aufgrund von Korruption wider. Laut einer Umfrage von *One to One for Research and Polling* gehen 31 % der Befragten davon aus, dass die meisten oder alle „Government officials" korrupt seien (vgl. Meddeb, 2018, S. 2). Ebenso sind 30 % der Befragten der Meinung, Mitglieder des Parlaments seien korrupt (vgl. ebd.). Damit führen diese beiden Personengruppen das Ranking für staatliche Repräsentant*innen an.

Aktivist 2 (2019) ordnet dieses Phänomen in Zusammenhang mit ökonomischen Sorgen und Problemen junger Menschen ein. Er ist der Meinung, die Korruption im Land sei noch höher, als es unter Ben Ali der Fall war, und junge Menschen sähen sich selbst bereichernde Politiker*innen, während sie selbst – außer der Meinungsfreiheit – nichts gewonnen hätten und unter der ökonomischen Situation litten (vgl. ebd.). Aktivist 2 fasst diese Enttäuschung folgendermaßen zusammen: „Nur mit Meinungsfreiheit können wir nicht leben. [...] Diese Leute wollen nichts Gutes für unser Land." (Aktivist 2, 2019, eigene Übersetzung). Tatsächlich hat der sozio-ökonomische Lebensstandard in Tunesien in den postrevolutionären Jahren erheblich abgenommen (vgl. Weilandt, 2018, S. 212). Daher steht der Vorwurf der Fortführung des von Korruption und Neo-Patrimonialismus geprägten Systems Ben Alis (vgl. Gallien und Werenfels, 2019, S. 4),

einhergehend mit einer Selbstbereicherung der Politiker*innen und ökonomischen Eliten, als Vertrauenslücke zwischen der politischen Klasse und jungen Bürger*innen, die hohen Raten von Arbeitslosigkeit und prekären Arbeitsbedingungen ausgesetzt sind (vgl. Weilandt, 2018).

Die interviewte Aktivistin 1 (2019) ergänzt, dass „[local politicians] are the people who are directly accountable to you as a citizen". Tatsächlich handelt es sich mit den am 6. Mai 2018 organisierten Kommunalwahlen in den 350 Gemeinden Tunesiens (vgl. Refle, 2018) um die ersten Kommunalwahlen in der postrevolutionären Phase des Landes. Sie werden als ein Mittel angesehen, die regionalen Disparitäten im Land zu verringern (vgl. Yardımcı-Geyikçi und Tür, 2018, S. 6) und der Marginalisierung einiger Regionen durch eine Stärkung der Eigenständigkeit der Kommunen und lokaler Mitbestimmung entgegenzuwirken (vgl. Refle, 2018). Dadurch, dass die politische Macht nahezu ausschließlich von der Zentralgewalt des Regimes Ben Alis ausging und das Maß an Dekonzentration und Dezentralisierung sehr gering war (vgl. Yerkes und Yachmed, 2019, S. 12; Abderrahim, 2018, S. 59f.), hatten Kommunen lediglich eine marginalisierte Stellung. Daher war zunächst ein Stärkungsprozess der Kommunen zwischen 2011 und 2014 und auch darüber hinaus von Nöten, um das Vertrauen in und die Einflussmöglichkeit von dieser Ebene erneut zu stärken (vgl. Volpi, Merone und Loschi 2016).

Somit zeigen sich erhebliche Vertrauensprobleme zwischen jungen tunesischen Bürger*innen und den formalisierten staatlichen Institutionen, die von der Europäischen Union in Tunesien fokussiert werden. Faktoren wie mangelnde Zugänglichkeit, Kontinuitäten des *Ancien Régime* sowie Korruption spielen hierbei eine wesentliche Rolle. Auch aus diesem Grund haben sich Jugendliche Prozessen einer „electoral democracy" abgewandt und sich in zivilgesellschaftlichen Räumen ausprobiert, deren entscheidende Rolle für politisches Engagement auch von der EU erkannt wurde. Welches Vertrauen junge tunesische Bürger*innen in diese Art der Partizipation stecken, wird im Folgenden analysiert.

Das Vertrauen junger Bürger*innen in zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement

Die Grundannahme der Europäischen Union als Donor-Organisation lautet, NGOs als Teil der Zivilgesellschaft seien „progressive and democratic" (Jad, 2007, S. 628; vgl. auch Rothers, 2018, S. 9) und könnten daher von sich aus als „motor of democratisation and development" (Jad, 2007, S. 628) angesehen werden. Aksartova (2006) stellt daran anknüpfend dar, dass insbesondere seit den 1990er-Jahren die US-amerikanische Regierung ebenso wie private Stiftungen zivilgesellschaftliche, das heißt unter direkter Einbeziehung von durch Bürger*innen unterstützte, Vereine und soziale Einheiten (vgl. Rothers, 2018, S. 17) als Akteure der Demokratisierung einbezogen haben und sich diese Kooperationsform bis heute fortsetzt.

Teile der tunesischen Zivilgesellschaft waren 2011 mit ihren verschiedenen Bereichen im *Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Révolution* vertreten und konnten sich im institutionellen Rahmen für ihre Forderungen für das postrevolutionäre System einsetzen (vgl. Zemni, 2015, S. 60). Als Errungenschaft dieser Repräsentation gilt das Dekret Nummer 88, das eine weitreichende Vereinigungsfreiheit zulässt (vgl. Shahin, 2018, S. 4). In der Konsequenz haben sich zwischen 2010 und 2018 rund 14.000 neue Vereine in den verschiedensten Bereichen gegründet (vgl. ebd., S. IV).

Dieser außergewöhnliche Charakter der tunesischen Zivilgesellschaft wurde auch von der externen Demokratieförderung der Europäischen Union oder einzelnen europäischen Staaten erkannt, die sich, ähnlich wie es in den 1990er-Jahren geschah (vgl. Aksartova, 2006), verschiedener Grassroot-Ansätze annäherten und zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure fördern (vgl. Burlafinger, 2018; Ferré, 2018; Bridoux und Kurki, 2014). Dabei ist anzumerken, dass weite Teile der zivilgesellschaftlichen Landschaft von externer Finanzierung abhängig bleiben, insbesondere von europäischen und US-amerikanischen Geber*innenorganisationen (vgl. Shahin, 2018, S. V; AlDailami und Pabst, 2014, S. 57).

Der Ansatz der EU, in „bottom-up"-Ansätze der Demokratisierung zu investieren, um die junge Demokratie in Tunesien zu konsolidieren, beruht auf der Annahme, dass diese Sphäre politischen Handelns über ein weitreichenderes Vertrauen von Bürger*innen verfügt. In den Augen der EU-Donor soll die Demokratisierung nicht nur über „top-down institutional dynamics" (Volpi, Merone und Loschi, 2016, S. 3) geschehen, sondern eine demokratische Basis in der Bürger*innenschaft gefunden werden. Roberts, Kovacheva und Kabaivanov (2017, S. 4) weisen darauf hin, dass die Zivilgesellschaft tatsächlich eine Sphäre darstellt, um junge Aktivist*innen von 2011 in das gesellschaftspolitische Leben einzubinden. Statistisch gesehen vertrauen junge tunesische Bürger*innen der Zivilgesellschaft in ihrem Land tatsächlich mehr als einigen staatlichen Institutionen. So hätten 12 % der Jugendlichen Vertrauen in NGOs (vgl. Dihstelhoff, 2018a, S. 8), während im gleichen Sample nur 3 % der Befragten Vertrauen in Parteien und 8 % ins Parlament haben (vgl. ebd.). Dies deckt sich in etwa auch mit anderen Studien zum Vertrauen in zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen im Land (vgl. Sika und Werenfels, 2017, S. 328). In diesem Kapitel wird daher untersucht, inwiefern junge tunesische Bürger*innen den von der EU-geförderten zivilgesellschaftlichen Räumen vertrauen und welche Spannungen sich daraus ergeben.

Die Struktur der tunesischen Zivilgesellschaft und ihre Attraktivität für junge Menschen

Ein Faktor, der zu einem ausgeprägten Vertrauen junger Bürger*innen in nicht-staatliche, zivilgesellschaftliche Institutionen beiträgt, ergibt sich durch das Gefühl, man könne einen direkten gesellschaftlichen Einfluss ausüben (vgl. Aktivist 2, 2019). Dieses Gefühl der Einflussmöglichkeit besteht nicht zuletzt darin, dass NGOs auch auf lokaler Ebene im unmittelbaren Umfeld der Jugendlichen agieren, wo der Einfluss einer

einzelnen Initiative viel höher ist (vgl. Stolleis, 2017, S. 337; Abderrahim, 2018, S. 64). Dieses Vertrauen ist verknüpft mit einer ansprechenden Tonalität (vgl. Siméant, 2014, S. 228), das heißt einer für junge Menschen attraktiven Atmosphäre innerhalb der Organisationen. Sowohl Aktivistin 1 als auch Aktivist 2 beschreiben, dass nicht-staatliche Akteure wie NGOs und Vereine in Tunesien die Sprache der Jugendlichen (vgl. Aktivist 2, 2019) bzw. „the youth language" (Aktivistin 1, 2019) sprechen und sie daher für junge Menschen zugänglich und attraktiv scheinen. Dies liegt unter anderem daran, dass nach 2011 eine Vielzahl von Vereinen von jungen engagierten Bürger*innen gegründet wurden und werden (vgl. Abderrahim, 2018, S. 66; auch Expertin 1, 2019; Aktivistin 1, 2019).

Ein weiterer Grund, warum junge Menschen in zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen ein relativ solides Vertrauen stecken, ist die Möglichkeit letzterer, staatliche Akteure zu kontrollieren und zu überwachen. Aktivist 2 (2019) weist darauf hin, dass es durch die Aktivität insbesondere junger Nichtregierungsorganisationen ermöglicht wird, die Arbeit von Parteien zu überwachen und auszuwerten. Damit spielt er auf die Watchdog-Funktion einiger NGOs in Tunesien an, die während des Demokratisierungsprozesses Vorgänge wie Abstimmungen im Parlament oder Wahlen auf ihre Konformität mit rechtlichen Vorgaben überprüfen (vgl. Gallien und Werenfels, 2019, S. 2; Bellin, 2018, S. 455). Als Beispiele können hier die Organisationen *I-Watch* sowie *Al Bawsala* genannt werden: *I-Watch* setzt sich überwiegend mit dem staatlichen Vorgehen gegen Korruption auseinander (vgl. Yerkes und Yahmed, 2019, S. 15). *Al Bawsala* hingegen überwacht parlamentarische Aktivitäten (vgl. ebd., S. 11; 15) und wird dabei von EU-Finanzierungen unterstützt (vgl. RBB Africa, 2020, S. 16). Die EU stützt also die von der tunesischen Zivilgesellschaft geschaffenen Räume, um die Fortschritte der politischen Transition eigenständig auszuwerten und Empfehlungen auszusprechen.

Die tunesische Zivilgesellschaft ist in einer Vielzahl von Bereichen tätig (vgl. Antonakis-Nashif, 2016, S. 129), die für junge Menschen relevant sind. Neben der bereits betrachteten Watchdog-Funktion sind zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen beispielsweise im gewerkschaftlichen Bereich (vgl. Yerkes und Yahmed, 2019, S. 15), im Bereich von Menschenrechten (vgl. Ferré, 2018, S. 18), der *Local Governance* sowie nachhaltiger Entwicklung tätig (vgl. Abderrahim, 2018, S. 66). Dabei ist die tunesische Zivilgesellschaft laut Expertin 1 (2019) zu weiten Teilen nicht im politischen Bereich aktiv: „Sie sind nicht sehr zahlreich in der politisch engagierten Zivilgesellschaft" (Expertin 1, 2019, eigene Übersetzung). Damit verweist sie auf die Gefahr einer Depolitisierung der tunesischen Zivilgesellschaft, wie sie Vickie Langohr (2004) vor der Revolution in Tunesien auch in Ägypten und der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde untersucht hat. Durch die Stärkung von zivilgesellschaftlichen Initiativen in Bereichen wie Ökologie oder Sozialarbeit kann der Staat nicht-staatliche Aktivitäten in politisch sensibleren Themen wie Menschenrechten und individuellen Freiheiten vermeiden (vgl. Datzberger, 2014, S. 62; Feldman, 2003), wodurch der Einfluss der Zivilgesellschaft im politischen Aushandlungsprozess sinkt. In Tunesien wirkt die Zivilgesellschaft aus diesem Grund auch in Bereichen wie erneuerbaren Energien (vgl. Roberts, Kovacheva und Kabaivanov, 2017, S. 4; Akermia, Hachana und Triki, 2017) sowie Sozialarbeit (vgl. Dihstelhoff, 2018a, S. 9) mit, die weniger im Konflikt mit der

Staatsgewalt stehen. Es zeigt sich also, dass durch die von der EU gestützten zivilgesellschaftlichen Räume eine Vertrauenskrise entsteht, da ein Gefühl der Depolitisierung und eines nur oberflächlichen politischen Einflusses vorliegt.

Vertrauenshemmende Elemente innerhalb der Zivilgesellschaft

Trotz dieser verschiedenen Faktoren, die zu einer Attraktivität der Zivilgesellschaft für junge Menschen beitragen, ist festzustellen, dass innerhalb der tunesischen Zivilgesellschaft einige vertrauenshemmende Elemente vorliegen, wie im folgenden Unterkapitel dargestellt wird. Diese Faktoren hängen zusammen mit externen Einflüssen wie die der EU, die auf die zivilgesellschaftliche Sphäre ausgeübt werden.

Die Finanzierung von tunesischen Nichtregierungsorganisationen durch internationale Organisationen wie die Europäische Union ist ein erster Kritikpunkt, dem sich die tunesische Zivilgesellschaft stellen muss und der das Vertrauen junger Bürger*innen in zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement einschränkt. Eine Vielzahl an tunesischen zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen ist von externer bzw. internationaler Finanzierung abhängig (vgl. Shahin, 2018, S. 7). Tatsächlich zeigt die Förderung durch externe Donor aber auch, dass sich die Organisation an deren politischen Leitlinien orientiert und damit eine gewisse Eigendynamik aufgegeben wird (vgl. Aksartova, 2006, S. 2), wie Aktivistin 1 (2019) es beschreibt:

„And the second is the NGOs launched by foreign aid in general, and that is extremely, extremely attacked. […] The reference to that program is: how would it work in the West, you know, how would we do this back at home? And they are not taking into consideration that it's different countries, different social, economic and political contexts."

Zudem sind es nicht nur die beschriebenen Vorgaben von Donor-Organisationen aus dem Globalen Norden (vgl. auch Petras, 1999, S. 429), sondern auch deren entsandtes Personal, das einen Kritikpunkt darstellt. So kritisiert Aktivistin 1 (2019) auch die Tatsache, dass sich Menschen aus dem Globalen Norden, die meist keine Bindung zu dem Land hätten, in Länder des Globalen Südens wie Tunesien begeben, um dort Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu leisten und stattdessen keine Bürger*innen mit lokaler Expertise rekrutiert werden.

Nathalie Ferré (2018) knüpft an diese Strukturierung der zivilgesellschaftlichen Landschaft Tunesiens an und stellt fest, dass es für die Europäische Union bei der Auswahl zivilgesellschaftlicher Partner in Tunesien auch immer um die Verteidigung eines bestimmten Gesellschaftsbildes geht (vgl. Ferré, 2018, S. 39), also immer eine bestimme normative Vorstellung der zivilgesellschaftlichen Landschaft von Seiten europäischer Donor vorliegt (vgl. auch Weilandt, 2021). Damit wird auch eine Aufteilung von Einsatzgebieten reproduziert, nach denen Donor-Organisationen ihre Arbeit strukturieren. Um Gelder für bestimmte Projekte zu erhalten, müssen Vereine

und Nichtregierungsorganisationen auf die Aufteilung nach Themenfeldern reagieren, die ihnen von Geldgebenden vorgegeben wird (vgl. Expertin 1, 2019). So kommt es beispielsweise dazu, dass das Engagement für sozio-ökonomische Rechte von dem für politische Freiheiten getrennt wird (vgl. ebd.). Des Weiteren ist eine Professionalisierung des zivilgesellschaftlichen Sektors (vgl. auch Siméant, 2001) eine Folge dieser externen Finanzierung (vgl. Expertin 1, 2019; Ferré, 2018, S. 18), wodurch NGOs zum Teil ihren Bezug zu Grassroots verlieren und die Forderungen anderer sozialer Milieus vernachlässigen (vgl. Petras, 1999, S. 432).

Mit diesem äußeren Einfluss hängt ein weiterer Punkt zusammen, der das Vertrauen zwischen jungen Bürger*innen und der Zivilgesellschaft zu schwächen scheint. Durch die externe Finanzierung von Vereinen ergab sich eine Konzentration auf wenige NGOs, bis hin zu einer Monopolbildung in der zivilgesellschaftlichen Landschaft Tunesiens. Auch wenn sich zwischen 2010 und 2018 ungefähr 14.000 neue Vereine und Nichtregierungsorganisationen gegründet haben und damit die Anzahl der registrierten Vereine auf rund 22.000 angestiegen ist (vgl. Shahin, 2018, S. IV), haben sich in den verschiedenen Einsatzbereichen vorreitende Organisationen herausgebildet, die den politischen Einfluss dominieren (vgl. u.a. Ferré, 2018, S. 25; Yerkes und Yahmed, 2019, S. 15). Dies betrifft unter anderem die Finanzierung von Vereinen, aber auch das Agenda-Setting und die Konsultation von Organisationen. Aktivistin 1 (2019) beschreibt:

„[Tunisian civil society] has easily turned into monopoles. [...] It's a monopolization, but on the basis of hard work. Eventually we have these two, three big associations that kind of have a say on the Tunisian civil society. And we know about them and we hear about their work. But all the thousands, all the other thousands we do not hear about a lot. [...] The ones who have a say are limited."

Ein weiterer Faktor, der sich aus der historischen Entwicklung des Landes ergibt, ist das Fortbestehen von Vereinen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen, die bereits unter Ben Ali und innerhalb seines neopatrimonialen Systems gegründet wurden. Auch im zivilgesellschaftlichen Bereich gab es nach 2011 Kontinuitäten. Tatsächlich gehörte es zur Strategie Ben Alis und anderer autokratischer Staatschefs in der MENA-Region, neue Institutionen in einer Vielzahl an Anwendungsgebieten zu gründen, um den Eindruck einer politischen Liberalisierung des Landes zu erwecken (vgl. Albrecht und Schlumberger, 2004, S. 380). Sowohl islamistische (vgl. Yardımcı-Geyikçi und Tür, 2018, S. 4) als auch säkulare Parteien (vgl. Dihstelhoff, 2018b, S. 35) verfügen heute landesweit über Grassroot-Ansätze und parteinahe Vereine. Dies untermalt die Analyse von Expertin 1 (2019), die tunesische Zivilgesellschaft agiere nicht als kritisches Kollektiv, sondern es gebe durchaus eine staatsnahe Zivilgesellschaft:

„Es hängt davon ab, von welcher Zivilgesellschaft man spricht. [...] Die tunesische Zivilgesellschaft ist aufgeteilt zwischen Vereinen, die eine staatsnahe Agenda verteidigen, und anderen, die sich in der Opposition positionieren, die aber zugleich sehr schwach bleiben, was soziale und ökonomische Forderungen angeht." (Expertin 1, 2019, eigene Übersetzung)

Es stellt sich nicht nur die Frage, in welchen Organisationen sich junge Menschen engagieren können, sondern auch, welche jungen Menschen überhaupt aktiv werden und welchen der Zugang auf verschiedene Weisen verwehrt bleibt. Tatsächlich ist das Konzept „Zivilgesellschaft" nicht frei von dem Vorwurf, es handele sich um eine elitäre Konzeption, zu der nur gewisse soziale Milieus Zugang hätten (vgl. u.a. Petras, 1999, S. 230; Bellin, 2018, S. 454). Auch in der MENA-Region wird ein Zusammenhang zwischen dem gesellschaftlichen Status und Engagement festgestellt (vgl. Stolleis, 2017, S. 340). An dieser Stelle kann mit Pierre Bourdieus (2015) Konzeption von sozialem und kulturellem Kapital argumentiert werden, das benötigt wird, um sich langfristig in zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen zu engagieren. Menschen mit geringerem finanziellem, sozialem und kulturellem Kapital werden von formalisiertem zivilgesellschaftlichem Engagement tendenziell ausgeschlossen, auch im tunesischen Exempel (vgl. Stolleis, 2017, S. 340; auch Petras, 1999, S. 430f.). Hier zeigt sich somit erneut, dass eine Lücke zwischen den formalisierten, EU-geförderten Partizipationsinstrumenten und möglichst inklusiver, klassenüberschreitender demokratischer Teilhabe vorliegt.

Zudem liegen hinsichtlich der Aktivität von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen eine regionale Disparität und ein Stadt-Land-Gefälle vor. Zwar existieren auch außerhalb der Großstädte sowie der wirtschaftlichen Zentren zivilgesellschaftliche Initiativen, die zum Teil auch von internationalen Fördernden unterstützt werden (vgl. u.a. für den Verein *APEK – Association de la Protection de l'Environnement à Ksibet el Mediouni*: Wagner, 2018), allerdings sind in Städten deutlich mehr Vereine registriert, zumal die urbanen Räume Tunesiens als deutlich politisierter beschrieben werden (vgl. Cherif, 2016, S. 2). Aus diesem Grund sind nur rund 3 % der Jugendlichen im ländlichen Raum in Vereinen engagiert (vgl. Ratka und Roux, 2016, S. 71).

Der restriktive Zugang zur Zivilgesellschaft wird nicht nur von ihr selbst verursacht, sondern auch von außen, vom Staat, verstärkt. Obwohl das Konzept der Zivilgesellschaft eigentlich Bürger*innen vor staatlichen Eingriffen schützen soll (vgl. Rowell, 2015, S. 20), stellen verschiedene Beobachter*innen fest, dass die Tendenz zur staatlichen Kontrolle des zivilgesellschaftlichen Raums in Tunesien zunimmt und es dabei auch zu Restriktionen und Auflösungen kommt (vgl. Boussem, 2019, S. 1; Shahin, 2018). Solche Einschränkungen zivilgesellschaftlicher Aktivitäten bewegen sich auch im Rahmen des „war against terrorism" (Albrecht und Schlumberger, 2004, S. 377; Shahin, 2018, S. IV), dem auch nicht-westliche Staaten seit den Ereignissen des 11. September 2001 beigetreten sind, um unter dem Deckmantel der Terrorismusbewältigung interne Oppositionelle im politischen Diskurs zu delegitimieren (vgl. Albrecht und Schlumberger, 2004, S. 377).

Innerhalb der tunesischen Zivilgesellschaft und ihr gegenüber scheint es an verschiedenen Stellen Vertrauenslücken zu geben. Auch hier sind es Kontinuitäten im politischen System, die diese Partizipationsform schwächen, aber auch die Begleitung durch externe Demokratieförderer wie die EU scheint ein Vertrauenshemmnis aufzubauen. Auch wenn die zivilgesellschaftliche Sphäre für viele junge Menschen als ein Mittel erscheint, um am politischen Leben mitzuwirken, stellen das notwendige

soziale und kulturelle Kapital eine entscheidende Variable dar. Erneut entsteht ein Spannungsfeld zwischen EU-gestützten formalisierten Partizipationsformen im Sinne einer auf Vereinigungsfreiheit beruhenden „liberal democracy" und Räumen informeller politischer Teilhabe, die sich von einem klassisch liberalen Demokratiebild entfernen. Dieser von der EU bisher nur wenig berücksichtigte Blickwinkel wird im letzten Kapitel dieses Beitrags untersucht.

Informelle Räume politischen Ausdrucks im öffentlichen Raum

In den vorangegangenen Kapiteln wurde erarbeitet, dass die Europäische Union im seit 2011 einsetzenden Demokratisierungsprozess Tunesiens die Möglichkeiten demokratischer Partizipation insbesondere durch formalisierte Öffnungen im politischen System unterstützt hat. Allerdings wurde auch aufgezeigt, dass demokratische Partizipation im institutionalisierten politischen System mittels Parteien und Wahlen nur wenig Vertrauen junger Menschen besitzt. Zudem wurde zwar eine Öffnung für zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen umgesetzt, aber auch diese Form politischer Partizipation bleibt für viele junge Menschen beschränkt. Im folgenden Kapitel wird daher aufgezeigt, dass sich einige junge tunesische Bürger*innen in informellen politischen Partizipationsräumen wiederfinden, die von der Europäischen Union und ihren Demokratisierungsprogrammen bisher nur wenig Berücksichtigung finden, zugleich aber wesentlich für den Ausdruck ihrer politischen Interessen sind.

Schon im Vorfeld der Proteste von 2010 und 2011 waren in Tunesien Ausdrucksformen wie Streiks und Versammlungen im öffentlichen Raum von entscheidender Bedeutung, vor allem im Jahr 2008 in der im Zentrum gelegenen Region von Gafsa (vgl. Zemni, 2015, S. 54; Ben Achour, 2016, S. 78). Diese Proteste waren insbesondere sozio-ökonomischer Natur, da sie sich für eine Sicherung von Arbeitsplätzen und eine Verbesserung von Arbeitsbedingungen in der lokalen Phosphatindustrie einsetzten (vgl. Zemni, 2015, S. 54f.; O'Brien, 2015, S. 1215). Dadurch, dass die Proteste weitestgehend unkoordiniert waren, entstanden in den anschließenden Jahren informelle Räume, in denen insbesondere junge Menschen aus „quartiers populaires" und aus ländlichen Räumen aktiv wurden, wodurch eine soziale Spaltung des Landes zum Vorschein trat (vgl. Merone, 2015). Die jungen Menschen demonstrierten überwiegend spontan im öffentlichen Raum und traten in Konfrontation mit Sicherheitskräften, was für viele zu einem Moment der Politisierung geführt hat (vgl. Ben Achour, 2016, S. 79).

Eine auch seit 2011 andauernde ökonomische Krise und damit verbundene, vom Internationalen Währungsfonds verhängte Sparmaßnahmen (Yardımcı-Geyikçi und Tür, 2018, S. 7) rufen in weiten Teilen der Bevölkerung Unzufriedenheit hervor, wodurch es immer wieder zu Streiks in verschiedenen Sektoren kommt (vgl. Gallien und Werenfels, 2019, S. 2; Vatthauer und Weipert-Fenner, 2017). Aus Sorge vor zu starker wirtschaftlicher Liberalisierung und Kontrollverlusten drücken einige Bürger*innen auch Widerstand und Zurückhaltung gegenüber dem wirtschaftlichen Einfluss der

Europäischen Union aus (vgl. Rudloff und Werenfels, 2018, S. 2f.). Aus diesem Grund werden Annahmen einer rein formalen, auf Wahlen, Institutionen sowie formellem zivilgesellschaftlichem Engagement beruhenden Demokratie von einigen tunesischen Bürger*innen zurückgewiesen, wie sich anhand verschiedener nicht-institutionalisierten Ausdrucksformen zeigt. Die alternativen Partizipationsformen im öffentlichen Raum, in denen sich viele Jugendliche in Tunesien bewegen, sind vielmehr nichtintendierter und informeller Natur, befinden sich aber für Policy-Maker wie die der EU nur wenig auf der Agenda.

Aufgrund des geringen Vertrauens in staatliche Institutionen begegnen junge Menschen in Tunesien dem postrevolutionären Prozess zunächst mit „'street politics', in the sense of the participation of social movements not conventionally organised into civil society associations or political parties" (Merone, 2015, S. 87). Bei dieser alternativen Form politischen Engagements geht es darum, den kollektiven und sozialen Raum zu besetzen und damit einen Akt des Widerstands gegen die Staatsgewalt zu vollziehen (vgl. Tripp, 2013, S. 73). Mit dem öffentlichen Raum wird im postautokratischen System ein Teil „from the hands of the few" (Tripp, 2015, S. 6) zurückgefordert und dieser symbolisch neu aufgeladen, um den politischen Übergang auch im öffentlichen Raum einzuleiten (vgl. Zemni, 2017, S. 78). Um eine „transformation of urban space into truly public space" (Tripp, 2013, S. 133) zu vollziehen, haben sich junge Bürger*innen den öffentlichen Raum durch künstlerisch-körperlichen Ausdruck angeeignet (vgl. Harris, 2015, S. 501): Mit dem Ausdruck ihrer Forderungen durch Aktionskunst in Form von teils spontanen Demonstrationen mit Slogans und Symbolen, Sit-Ins, Straßenblockaden sowie Zusammenstößen mit Polizeikräften und der damit vorgenommenen Aneignung des öffentlichen Raums setzen die Teilnehmenden ihren eigenen Körper ein. Dieser Einsatz von Körperlichkeit während eines Protests weist Parallelen zum Selbstverbrennungsakt des 27-jährigen Gemüsehändlers Mohamed Bouazizi im Dezember 2010 auf. Der Einsatz von Körpern als Träger einer politischen Identität (vgl. Butler, 2016, S. 19) kann zu Protestformen und „Symbolic Forms of Resistance" (Tripp, 2013, S. 256) gezählt werden. Dabei kann es zu künstlerischen Komponenten kommen, zu einem Zusammenspiel aus Kunst und Aktivismus im öffentlichen Raum, bei dem die Kunst eine soziale Funktion einnimmt.

Auch wenn Demonstrationen konkret zum Objekt einer teilnehmenden Beobachtung werden können, muss die sozio-ökonomische sowie geografische Lage bei der ethnographischen Betrachtung sozialer Bewegungen berücksichtigt werden: Teilweise werden eingetragene zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen in die Veranstaltung der Demonstrationen einbezogen, die jedoch in urbanen und wohlständischen Räumen deutlich präsenter und formalisierter sind als in ruralen (vgl. Cherif, 2016, S. 2; Ratka und Roux, 2016, S. 71). Währenddessen finden die informellen Demonstrationen eher in populär geprägten Vierteln oder in ländlichen Regionen statt, wo auch die Proteste von 2010/2011 ihren Ursprung hatten (vgl. Zemni, 2017, S. 70).

Daneben sind es insbesondere zwei unter jungen Menschen als populär geltende künstlerische Produkte, die im öffentlichen Raum als Protestform wahrgenommen werden können: „Visual Arts" wie Graffiti (vgl. Tripp, 2013, S. 261) sowie Musik,

darunter vor allem Rapmusik (vgl. Mekki, 2018). Letztere wird als eine Form des Ausdrucks von Frustration erachtet (vgl. Merone, 2015, S. 82; Ratka und Roux, 2016, S. 74; Harris, 2015, S. 497) und beschreibt insbesondere die Lebenssituation junger Menschen in einer „houma chaabia", auch „quartier populaire" genannt (vgl. Golpushnezad, Barone und Dia, 2016, S. 28), die politisch und ökonomisch marginalisiert sind und sich von Parteien und zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen ausgeschlossen fühlen. Über die Texte und Graffiti können Jugendliche ihren Widerstand gegen das System auf künstlerische, verschlüsselte oder auch anonyme Weise ausdrücken, grenzen sich über die Songs aber zum Teil auch von anderem Formen des Widerstands ab, beispielsweise gegen islamistischen Terrorismus. Ein Beispiel, das die Frustration junger Menschen gegen staatliche Autoritäten demonstriert, ist der Song „Boulissya kleb" (etwa: „Polizisten sind Hunde") des tunesischen Rappers Weld El 15, in dem durch Gewaltaufrufe Hass gegen Polizeikräfte insbesondere in marginalisierten Regionen ausgedrückt wird. Allerdings ist das Produzieren und Performen von Rapmusik ebenso eine Art des Meinungsausdrucks, die im direkten Konflikt mit der Staatsgewalt steht (vgl. Sayigh, 2015, S. 18) und in ihrer Zugänglichkeit eingeschränkt wird.

Eine weitere Ebene öffentlichen Ausdrucks ist mit den beschriebenen künstlerischen Produkten eng verknüpft: Für die Verbreitung und Popularisierung von Medien wie Musik und Graffitis sind das Internet und soziale Medien nicht zu vernachlässigende Sphären des Meinungsausdrucks. Wenngleich dort keine direkte physische, sondern lediglich eine virtuelle Präsenz vorliegt, können sie als Medien des Widerstands und insbesondere zur Verbreitung von Symbolen, Texten und Grafiken dienen (vgl. Tripp, 2013, S. 301f.). Nicht nur während der Proteste von 2010/2011 (vgl. Graziano, 2012; Finn und Momani, 2019), sondern auch in den ersten Jahren der Demokratisierung haben sich soziale Netzwerke und Blogs durch den weniger reglementierten Zugang popularisiert (vgl. Gafsi, 2017). Das postrevolutionäre Tunesien kann als ein Beispiel für die These angesehen werden, das Internet gelte als Agora und Medium des Ausdrucks und des Austauschs, wo an Politik mitgewirkt werden kann (vgl. Engelmann, Legrand und Marzinkowksi, 2019, S. 39). Diese Agora des Ausdrucks wird allerdings verschieden genutzt – eine einheitliche „soziale Praxis" der Internetnutzung junger Tunesier*innen kann in dem Sinne zurückgewiesen werden, als dass unter anderem der sozio-ökonomische Status der Nutzer*innen und Gruppenzugehörigkeiten (vgl. Graziano, 2012, S. 11) Einfluss auf den Umgang mit dem Medium haben. Zudem ist das Internet, ebenso wie die anderen Mittel des politischen Ausdrucks, Schauplatz von Konflikten mit staatlicher Gewalt: Verschiedene politische Analysen (vgl. Gallien und Werenfels, 2019, S. 3; Human Rights Watch, 2018) sowie Interviewpartner*innen (vgl. u.a. Aktivist 2, 2019; Expertin 1, 2019) berichten von Festnahmen aufgrund der Meinungsäußerung von Blogger*innen und Nutzer*innen sozialer Netzwerke.

Somit stellt sich heraus, dass sich der tunesische Demokratisierungsprozess auch durch alternative und informelle Formen politischen Ausdrucks im öffentlichen Raum auszeichnet, die nicht zu den strikten Annahmen einer „electoral democracy" oder einer „liberal democracy" zählen. Diese Stimmen insbesondere junger Menschen gelten als Weckruf, dass nicht alle Bürger*innen Tunesiens die Folgen der Revolution auf gleiche

Weise wahrnehmen: Sozio-ökonomische Unsicherheit, Unterdrückung durch staatliche Institutionen sowie alternative Demokratiekonzepte sind Anliegen, die einige junge Menschen von der neuen Demokratie abhängen könnten. In diesem Sinne stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern die Europäische Union als externe Demokratisierungsakteurin diese Stimmen auf ihre Agenda setzt, um eine möglichst inklusive und nachhaltige Demokratie zu unterstützen – auch wenn sie dafür von ihren eigenen Vorstellungen über Demokratie abrücken muss. Auch informellen und nicht-professionalisierten politischen Bewegungen, die neue Versuche demokratischer Partizipation wagen, sollte die EU daher eine Stimme geben, um ihren Ansprüchen lokaler Anpassung gerecht zu werden.

Schlussbetrachtungen: EU-Demokratisierungsprojekte für wen?

In Tunesien bleiben Demokratisierungsversuche wie die der Europäischen Union in der lokalen Akzeptanz nicht unumstritten und werden von zahlreichen Reaktionen als „foreign interventions from the West" (Kienle, 2007, S. 239) bezeichnet, insbesondere, wenn es zu „[d]emocracy by imposition" (Bridoux und Kurki, 2014, S. 54) kommt. Die Gefahr dessen liegt darin, dass die im Rahmen des Demokratisierungsprozesses eingeführten Institutionen an Legitimität verlieren, weil sie als durch internationale Akteure aufgesetzt betrachtet werden, die sich Vorwürfen des Paternalismus und Neokolonialismus stellen müssen.

Nach der theoretischen Einführung in die Demokratisierungsansätze der Europäischen Union wurde gezeigt, dass sich nur wenige junge Menschen von Parteien und Politiker*innen vertreten fühlen. EU-Demokratisierungsprogramme in Tunesien fokussieren sich vornehmlich auf elektorale Prozesse und die Förderung institutioneller Stabilität, die vermeintlich mit wirtschaftlicher Prosperität einhergehen sollen. Die von den Politiker*innen und den Institutionen angegangenen politischen Themen entsprechen allerdings kaum den Erwartungen junger Menschen, die zudem eine Kontinuität der politischen Klasse sehen und keine Trennschärfe zwischen Parteien feststellen. Anschließend wurde dargelegt, dass die von EU-Fördernden proklamierten „bottom-up"-Ansätze mit der Beteiligung nicht-staatlicher Organisationen eine kritische Betrachtung benötigen, da junge Menschen auch hier von politischen Kontinuitäten abgeschreckt werden und zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen aufgrund von Monopolbildungen, der Nähe einiger Vereine zum Staat und dem Einfluss externer Demokratiefördernder als wenig inklusiv erachtet werden. Aus diesen Gründen haben sich junge Menschen alternative Wege des Ausdrucks ihrer Forderungen und ihres Widerstands angeeignet, die in der Aneignung des öffentlichen Raumes und im darin stattfindenden Ausdruck durch Demonstrationen, Kunst und Online-Aktivismus liegen. Diese Formen befinden sich im andauernden Konflikt mit der staatlichen Gewalt.

Demokratieförderprogramme der Europäischen Union in Tunesien agieren in einem Spannungsfeld, das sich durch Kontinuitäten zwischen dem *Ancien Régime* und dem

heutigen politischen System auszeichnet. Dies wird mitunter als „refo-lution" (Keskes und Martin, 2018, S. 16) bezeichnet und bringt eine Mischung aus Revolution und Reformprozess hervor und kein gänzlich neues politisches System. Für die Europäische Union besteht in ihrer Außenpolitik die Gefahr, durch die Trennung von politischen und sozio-ökonomischen Anliegen die Stimmen bestimmter Gruppen zu depolitisieren und sich zu sehr auf formale politische Prozesse zu fokussieren (vgl. auch Langohr, 2004). Dementsprechend werden Forderungen laut, die eigenen Vorstellungen nicht über demokratische Systeme zu stellen und auf lokale Gegebenheiten näher einzugehen (vgl. Weilandt, 2021), um auch neue Modelle demokratischen Ausdrucks zuzulassen und nicht nur auf geopolitische Stabilität zu pochen.

In diesem Artikel wurde herausgestellt, dass der Ausdruck im öffentlichen Raum – sei es auf physischer, graphisch-musikalischer oder virtueller Ebene – eine tatsächlich von tunesischen Jugendlichen genutzte Möglichkeit darstellt, ihr Misstrauen auszudrücken und Forderungen an Politik und Gesellschaft für einen Systemwandel zu stellen. Damit entstehen neben Parteien und zivilgesellschaftlichen Initiativen alternative Partizipationsräume, in denen liberale Grundannahmen demokratischer Partizipation herausgefordert werden, aber zugleich durch „Politik von unten" eine Alternative zum „exit" (Hirschman, 1970) aus dem System geschaffen wird. Jugendliche beweisen damit, dass es sich mit ihrem Misstrauen vielmehr um eine Systemverdrossenheit als um eine Politikverdrossenheit handelt. Dennoch wird dieser nicht-formalisierte und gering institutionalisierte Ausdruck im Demokratisierungsprozess Tunesiens überwiegend nicht von EU-Policy-Makern anerkannt. Um ein möglichst inklusives demokratisches System zu schaffen, ist die Anerkennung dieser Anliegen jedoch unumgänglich.

Zugleich zeigt sich auf allen drei betrachteten Ebenen der soziologische Unterschied, dass Menschen mit geringerem sozialem und kulturellem Kapital im Sinne Pierre Bourdieus (2015), die aus Parteien und der Zivilgesellschaft ausgeschlossen sind, sich eher den informellen Partizipationsräumen zuwenden. Es werden soziale Brüche innerhalb der tunesischen Gesellschaft sichtbar, die dazu führen, dass sich junge Menschen mit unterschiedlichen sozialen Hintergründen auf unterschiedliche Weise im postrevolutionären System sozialisieren. Wie Giuseppe Merone (2015) beschreibt, ist der Aushandlungsprozess über die Zukunft der tunesischen Demokratie letztendlich „not only a power struggle but also a process of class inclusion and exclusion" (Merone, 2015, S. 87). Subalterne Stimmen außerhalb formalisierter und institutioneller Partizipationsräume riskieren also, von europäischer Demokratieförderung marginalisiert und ausgeschlossen zu bleiben.

Interviews

Aktivistin 1 (2019): Persönliches Interview, 34 Minuten. Tunis, März 2019.

Aktivist 2 (2019): Persönliches Interview, 37 Minuten. Tunis, März 2019.

Expertin 1 (2019): Persönliches Interview, 35 Minuten. Tunis, März 2019.

Experte 2 (2019): Persönliches Interview, 91 Minuten. Tunis, Februar 2019.

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